Lithuania must reconsider its security concept as soon as possible in response to dramatic developments in the international arena, says Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis. The global structure created after the Cold War is crumbling right in front of our eyes, but Lithuania still avoids talking about emerging existential threats, he argues in an interview with ELTA.
Looking at the Ukrainian front, I’m increasingly concerned. Not only because of what Ukraine’s top military and political leadership have already admitted – the counteroffensive has stalled. There is also the geopolitical context. We don’t see fatigue in Western countries but rather confusion and a sort of strategic bewilderment, and military aid is stalling. What do you make of these tendencies?
I would start with the usual wording – this is both worrying and concerning. All of this poses enormous challenges for the West. The geopolitical situation in Europe may shift dramatically. We are at the precipice of a new reality.
The European Union, since the start of the war, unexpectedly to itself, has assumed a geopolitical stance. Seven defensive aid packages have been allocated for Ukraine. This was a serious step. Sanctions on Russia...
This is far from sufficient.
Yes, but this has happened, and it should not be denied. However, now we have been stuck for half a year at the 8th package. The major weakness of the EU has been exposed – the principle of unanimity. [...]
The package of sanctions, it seems, is moving ahead, but it doesn’t guarantee that Russia will be unable to manufacture, for instance, drones.
How may the situation at the front be assessed? Yes, Ukraine received aid and proved that it can do wonders with the support it gets, but only because it has a tremendous will to defend itself. We are and will be forever grateful for that. Where it was not compensated with weapons, it compensated with the blood of its people. With its [people’s] lives it literally shielded all of us, including Lithuania.
What aid does Ukraine actually need? Let’s imagine Poland, a country similar in size to Ukraine that shares the same enemies. On the one side, it has Russia, a border with Kaliningrad, just as we have, and [on the other side], Belarus, which is Russia’s ally in the war against Ukraine. What acquisitions has Poland announced? A thousand tanks, nearly 600 HIMARS systems, the most modern F-35 jets. The procurement list is arguably the most impressive in the world. Compare this to what Ukraine has received: several dozen HIMARS, several dozen tanks... This is around a twentieth of what Poland would defend with, which is also a NATO member and has Article 5 guarantees.
Isn’t Poland by arming like this indicating that it does not fully trust Article 5?
It’s hard to say. At least today it doesn’t have a reason to doubt it.
Maybe it is preparing for every scenario...
It is preparing for every scenario. It always has to be mentioned that we trust Article 5, that it is sacred, and the Americans have reiterated this. Yet, it’s a political provision. This means that behind every decision, behind every vote, there are politicians who may have different interests. And those interests are crystallising.
Take Sweden’s NATO accession. It looks like we are at the finish line, but the last metres are very long. Turkey now had to consider this matter at the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, but it was rescheduled for another day. This seems to be delayed bit by bit. We can only imagine a country on the eastern flank that would need some sort of a decision. Perhaps not because of the invasion, perhaps assistance would be requested over a different threat. And suddenly decisions, which needed to be adopted in several days, are delayed simply because a consensus cannot be reached.
Don’t you think that such decisions may be needed very soon because it’s obvious that the Kremlin regime and its puppet Minsk regime are thinking about a revenge plan against neighbouring NATO countries? There is a range of actions: from the tested irregular migrants to terrorist attacks.
That’s why I’m talking about the new geopolitical reality. In other words, if the West doesn’t ensure Ukraine’s victory, an opportunity is created for Putin to declare victory and start preparing for a new war. And it may be anywhere.
This is already the third war. So, whoever may claim that this is the end [that war in Ukraine is Russia’s last one], they clearly either don’t know what they’re talking about or they’re lying to reassure the public. 2008 was the end, 2014 was the end. And it could be that in 2024, someone will come out and say, “You know, we’ve reached a deal with Russia, and they actually made a promise”. That would be a lie.
Therefore, the only question now is how much all of us on the eastern flank will be prepared for the next blow. Russia can recover despite looking hurt, having lost loads of people. For them, they’re just people. For us, people are the most precious thing we have. The same goes for Ukraine. That is what distinguishes democracies from authoritarian countries.
Let’s imagine the worst-case scenario. Russia is obviously striving to switch to the war of attrition. Ukraine starts crumbling in every sense of the word. The front starts collapsing, the state starts collapsing, politically, too. Economy, infrastructure sustained by Western injections would start falling apart. What would be the West’s reaction then?
I think we’re in a situation where some believe that Ukraine’s position, and their realising the position they are in, might force them to put their hands up.
In other words, Ukraine wouldn’t be told to put up its hands, but one would wait for it to grasp that there is no other solution.
A slow death would be observed.
Could stalling weapon deliveries to Ukraine be related to that?
It’s difficult to say. There are objective reasons. The political situation in the US has really heated up. This could have been predicted. The country is polarised, and Ukraine is an issue of political disagreement. Democracy functions similarly everywhere.
The biggest problem is that Ukraine hasn’t become a war of the West. Lithuania has accepted this. Although we’re part of the West, we stand out from the entire group. Therefore, this is our war, and many Lithuanians take this personally – we have to win this war. Support of our public, of our authorities, proves that we accepted this [as our war]. Yet, the rest of the West hasn’t done so. They believe it is the war of Ukrainians, which they might win, or maybe not, we may help, but when we no longer can, then we will not.
If we look historically, Iraq’s war against Kuwait had become a war of the West for entirely different reasons. The coalition that united more than 50 countries led by the US made it “our war”. It’s very similar. A larger regional power attacks a smaller country. The world states this is a violation of the rule of law, thus we have to help Kuwait defend itself. Processes in the Middle East begin, and American power grows remarkably. Whereas in Ukraine’s case, we are not saying this, we are not doing this. I’m not talking about deploying troops to the territory. I’m talking about the need for mental understanding that the loss would be about us.
Ukrainians constantly repeat that this is “your war” in the sense that after them, we would naturally be next. Doesn’t this argument work?
It hasn’t been perceived. Therefore, responsibility is not assumed, nor is there understanding. Imagine discussions about negotiations sometime in the future. I would not rule out that they potentially exist. If Ukrainians are not supplied weapons, we may find ourselves in a situation where nothing can be done.
But Russians won’t be negotiating. They will go further.
Expectations [of negotiations with Russia] are highly naïve. Hence, we have to avoid the cynical claim that the decision is made by Ukrainians. This is not the decision of Ukrainians. Ukrainians would continue fighting until the Ukrainian flag is raised on the Swallow’s Nest in Crimea, until Donbas and Luhansk are liberated, and all the territories recognised by international law are returned. But they can accomplish this only if we can help them. If our aid stops, they will be forced to halt. This is our responsibility.
Do you see a tendency in the West to begin talks about Russia’s re-legalisation, about opening some dialogue again?
Vocabulary is constantly repeating. “European security is impossible without Russia”. We heard this before the war, at the onset of the war, during the war...
They also say that this war cannot be finished with military means alone.
Yes, they say we will need to talk nonetheless. But we argue that Europe’s security has to be created [separately] from Russia, not [together] with Russia. Our entire historical experience and political experience of recent decades proves that Europe needs security against Russia. We need to help Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Lithuania, and Poland defend against Russia because its goals are imperial, offensive. All the measures that are being used are meant to enslave, destroy, exterminate, wipe out, and subjugate us. This is their policy. I see no concord with this policy because it is directed at us.
The other tendency, as we have already indicated, centres on the situation in the US. The main thing there, which will determine everything that concerns Ukraine, is the presidential elections. It may again result in Donald Trump being elected. His views on NATO are well known. Some US media outlets signal that Trump and his circle are already making serious preparations to take action if he is elected – either to pull the US out of NATO or put the country on “standby” mode. Are there real dangers there in your opinion?
What you mention makes nightmare scenarios for Lithuania.
But we live in times when even the worst nightmare scenarios become reality.
I believe that Lithuania must actively consider changes to its security concept and security paradigm that was built 30 years ago.
What do you mean?
We have a paradigm, which led us to abandon conscription after Lithuania joined NATO. Then we reconsidered a whole lot of things. The reason for that is that Article 5 has been and remains central to our security paradigm. In 2014, interestingly for me, Lithuania raised the alarm saying that Article 5 is the foundation, but we have to carry more of the burden ourselves. The conscription was brought back, the Riflemen’s Union was strengthened. I would say that a paradigm-level debate was launched to discuss the security situation we are in.
However, I cannot say that we have already started a discussion that reflects the actual geopolitical situation outside Lithuania’s borders. Despite the fact that we support Ukraine, which is one of the issues uniting the country the most, we have not dared to name fully its direct link to our security.
The US and its global attention, including where it will be directed next, is no less important. It’s probably not a secret that Lithuania’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific region has a partly transatlantic dimension in it. Being aware of our main partner shifting its focus to the other side of the world, we need to learn about processes and interests our partners may have there. After all, we don’t have any other pillar.
Are you saying it is possible that even the key partner could switch to some other regime?
We are living in a time of dramatic change. The world is transforming from one state to another. The West perceived the fall of the Berlin Wall as changing the reality of the Cold War into something else – an era of European, transatlantic peace, which has shaped most of today’s politics. We’re now living at a moment when the Berlin Wall is being rebuilt. The war against Ukraine is creating a new reality where change can be dramatic.
Do I understand it correctly – what you are saying is that Lithuania is not sufficiently aware that there may come a moment, sooner than we expect, when it is left on its own, at least for a while, for an existential test?
I want to believe that the country won’t be left on its own, as it was in 1939. Back then, we had no alliances. In any case, we’re now part of the most powerful alliance in the world.
Alliances will be tested – I have no doubt about that. Especially if Ukraine is not helped to win, the opportunities would open for Russia to test these alliances in all sorts of ways – military and other. Therefore, we need to reassess what could make a difference and what could help our security.
I would single out a few aspects here. The first is the US. It remains, and will continue to be, the essential pillar of our security. However, we need to become much more aware of the changing interests of the US and be ready to respond to them. The second aspect is Germany’s involvement and taking responsibility for European security. This manifests in Lithuania.
The courage to become a political leader of the EU as well.
Unequivocally yes. This manifestation is obvious with a brigade in Lithuania. German brigade troops appear in Lithuania on a potential front, where their presence, just like that of the Americans in West Berlin, would deter Russia from taking military actions. This change is enormous and strategic and we have not had it before. [...]
I think that we need to review and re-evaluate our regional partnerships. The role of Poland should be assessed objectively. Poland is becoming a military superpower in the region. Our strategic partnership is taking on a new meaning in the face of geopolitical turmoil. Our military relationship with Poland is becoming increasingly important. I would not exclude the Nordic and Baltic countries either. The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO and their significant military capabilities are essential pillars for us.
Then we come to the fundamental question – what about ourselves? What weight should we be able to carry as a country of less than three million people? A country in an extremely sensitive, vulnerable situation between two hostile states: Belarus and Russia. What weight can we carry? Poland has shown what they can carry, or what they plan to carry. We have not discussed that yet.
But the entire Lithuanian political elite demonstrates the overall movement in that direction – the state is increasing preparations and allocations, as well as mustering the political will to boost its own defence. Are you saying this is not enough?
In terms of the paradigm, we’re at the point we were ten years ago. We ourselves have become richer, ready to allocate more resources to defence. We can be proud of that. Just over 2.5 percent of GDP for defence, plus the money that will come from the additional bank levy next year and the year after. All of this puts Lithuania in the top 5 or top 3 countries in terms of defence spending. This is a serious statement.
Yet, it seems to me that finance alone doesn’t reflect our reality. If Ukraine is forced to negotiate, the world, especially those in close proximity to Ukraine, must start preparing for the next war. I cannot say when that will be. Maybe in a decade, maybe in five or several years. It’s very difficult for me to say. But we may have very little time – and I do feel that and understand that very clearly.
That is why I’d very much like to see public discussions about universal conscription and defence spending going above 2.5 percent. It is necessary, but it will come at a cost. One cannot just go to the bank and borrow half a percentage of GDP. We have to agree and admit that the state is in a dangerous geographic location, and we have already witnessed a history of targeting us. [The history] can repeat itself, and we must have a response to that.
Let’s move on to the next front – China and Taiwan. The problem has recently been exacerbated by the visit of Taiwan’s foreign minister to Lithuania. You did not meet him. Once again and once and for all – why?
There are certain rules for diplomatic cooperation between states or entities. Our cooperation with Taiwan respects the rules. It is not Lithuania’s stance; it is the stance of Western countries not to have government-level contact with Taiwan. This rule doesn’t apply to parliaments.
Whether it is the parliament speaker or ordinary MPs, they have more freedom.
Yes. China is testing such limits and trying to narrow them down. For example, former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan is an acceptable norm. Then I allowed myself to express my joy over the fact that she went there. However, if the visit had been cancelled, new rules would have been adopted, making it much more difficult for [Seimas Speaker] Viktorija Čmilytė-Nielsen to travel there. China is a difficult partner, which is using its ultimate power. One must have a strong backbone to withstand those [tests on] limits.
This reasoning is understandable, but you would probably admit that amid all the uproar, the main narrative that went public was what the opposition parties were saying – that Landsbergis and the conservatives are hypocrites, that they have recently been slaying the dragon, and now they befriended him. This was further intensified by your statement about the ongoing process of normalising relations with China.
First, about Taiwan. Our foreign policy’s assessment coming from political players is often superficial. I need to stress that Lithuania’s relations with Taiwan have never been stronger than they are today. They are growing closer in cultural circles and especially in economic circles, where we have committed to cooperation by allowing them to open a non-diplomatic representation in Lithuania. So, it’s really not fair to take one headline or an individual episode, ignoring all the consistent work that is being done.
Now, on China: to my mind, we have had two moments with China where illegal actions were used against Lithuania. First, the measures of economic pressure that were put in place when Taiwan opened a representative office in Vilnius. I must highlight that, following discussions and various diplomatic processes, some of which are still ongoing at the World Trade Organisation, most of the economic pressure measures against Lithuania have been lifted.
What I haven’t made so clear in the past is that Lithuania is no longer under any economic pressure from China. While the trade, which hasn’t been restored, has been more than compensated for. Our exports have been growing and continue to grow very successfully and in a robust way in both the Indo-Pacific region and Europe, despite all the shocks. Businesses are not choosing China as a partner because of previous experiences and understanding that the country uses the economy as a tool. [...]
The second tool that has been used against Lithuania is diplomatic pressure. China is demanding that Lithuania rename its diplomatic mission in Beijing in line with its model. But we have no such models in place. The talks on harmonising the “visions” have been ongoing for the past year.
But your position is not that the Taiwanese representative office should be renamed to meet China’s demands.
No, [it is not]. The issue of the Taiwanese representative office is not part of our discussions with Beijing. It’s a question of how to alleviate the pressure on Lithuania, how to remove that pressure, which, in my view, runs contrary to international norms. I believe that with patience and skill, this issue can be resolved.
There have been interpretations that you didn’t meet with the Taiwanese minister and announced talks on normalising relations with China because of the intervention from the US.
Nothing of the sort. Our path regarding the economic and diplomatic pressure was confirmed and agreed upon among the institutions several years ago. We’re taking that path. It’s too early to talk about very tangible results. I believe that Taiwan has the right to have a representative office in Lithuania under the name they have chosen. That permission has been given to them, and I don’t see any change in that, nor do I think there can be any.
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