Belarus is clearly a co-belligerent country in Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine. But why is the EU so soft on Aleksander Lukashenko, often labelled Europe’s “last dictator”? Georgi Gotev argues for EurActiv, partners of LRT English.
About a quarter of the Russian troops that invaded Ukraine came from Belarusian territory. The troops were deployed under the pretext of holding military exercises.
According to the CIA, Belarus railroads were used to transport some 30,000 Russian troops into Ukraine, while Belarusian hospitals were used to treat wounded Russian soldiers.
The worst war crimes uncovered so far, in Bucha and Irpin, are the deeds of Russian forces that came from Belarus.
After the Russian army suffered defeat in Ukraine’s north, Lukashenko’s Belarus continued to help Putin’s Russia by providing its territory as a launchpad for Russian missile strikes against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, making it an accomplice in other war crimes.
Last November, an independent Belarusian railway initiative said that Minsk had transferred 65,000 metric tons of ammunition to Russia since the start of Russia’s war.

Lukashenko has acknowledged his country’s status as a co-belligerent in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
In an interview with AFP last July 21, he confirmed that his country supports Russia, provides its territory for missile strikes on Ukraine, and provides medical and intelligence assistance to Russian troops.
“Yes, we are taking part in this operation,” Lukashenko said.
At the same time, the EU has adopted sanctions on Belarus that do not include many of those adopted against Russia.
For example, after Russia invaded Ukraine, only 22 military commanders have been listed personally, while discrepancies between the categories of goods under sanctions potentially allow Belarus to smuggle to Russia European products banned in Russia but still legally imported in Belarus.
Read more: How sanctioned Belarusian firm channeled exports via Lithuania – investigation
Another peculiarity is that many representatives of big business associated with Lukashenko’s inner circle, called “Lukashenko’s wallets”, remain outside the scope of EU sanctions.
One may imagine that EU leaders don’t want to be tough on the Belarusian people because clearly, opposition candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya won the 2020 elections but was barred from power, which means sanctions should affect the dictator and not the people, who clearly want to be part of Europe.
But may also be another reason for that.
European diplomats are aware of plans by the Kremlin to absorb Belarus. Last month a leaked document purportedly revealed Kremlin’s plans to annex its smaller neighbour by 2030.
This would mean bringing Russian nuclear weapons to the borders of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, all three NATO members. Belarus reportedly has nuclear-capable Iskander missiles on its soil, and Putin has spoken of upgrading Belarusian Su-25 fighters to carry nuclear weapons.

But the project could be accelerated: Annexing Belarus would offer Putin a way to save face over the Ukraine debacle.
Lukashenko is in a difficult position and doesn’t want to worsen it. The Belarus army is reportedly tiny and weak, and Lukashenko should not count on its loyalty.
So far, the army has not been involved in the war against Ukraine and has remained stationed inside Belarus throughout the conflict. Lukashenko has stated that there was “no way” he would send soldiers into Ukraine unless attacked first.
For now, Putin sees interest in Belarus remaining a separate country – at least under international law. Western diplomats believe Putin may use Belarus not only to smuggle prohibited goods but as an official destination for the weapons and ammunition his army needs.
China, seen as a possible provider of weaponry, might think it’s less burdensome to deliver armament to Belarus. But officially supplying the aggressor state with weapons, even through an intermediary, is a red line for the West. Beijing has probably received the warning.
A colleague from Belarus told me that Lukashenko’s fall into Putin’s arms has been a gradual process over the past 20 years, which has accelerated in recent years.
The main driver for this is Lukashenko’s ineffective economic system, making the country dependent on Russian subsidies and cementing his dependence on the Kremlin to back his forced control over the population that, in all likelihood, voted him out in 2020.
To remain in control of Belarus, Lukashenko will have to continue paying Putin every couple of years with new pieces of Belarus’ sovereignty – of which there is already very little left.
One thing is sure: it is not in the interests of the West to make moves that would push Lukashenko deeper into Putin’s ’embrace’.
Who knows, Lukashenko might even host new peace talks in Minsk, depending on how the situation in Ukraine evolves. This is not the West’s preferred option – but if it is available, why waste it?
Georgi Gotev is a journalist and Senior Editor for EurActiv's Global Europe policy hub and the Editor-in-Chief of EurActiv's Bulgarian edition.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of LRT.




