The joint statement by President Gitanas Nausėda and Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Germany’s increased defence commitments to Lithuania has sparked a storm of political controversy in Lithuania. While Lithuanian politicians are discussing whether Berlin will deploy a brigade here, the German ambassador stresses that the brigade is assigned to Lithuania’s defence and will train here, but, as things stand now, will not be permanently deployed.
“It’s the best that can be done now,” Matthias Sonn told LRT.lt in an exclusive interview. “As you well know and everybody in Lithuania admits, the infrastructure of Lithuania would not be able to accommodate a full brigade.”
The ambassador would not speculate, however, whether Berlin would permanently deploy a brigade-sized unit here in the future, once Lithuania builds the needed infrastructure.
Read more: LRT FACTS. Permanent or remote – what kind of brigade did Germany promise to Lithuania?
In December, you gave a speech in the Seimas, where you talked about the political discussions surrounding the brigade in Lithuania. And you called those discussions “corrosive and harmful”. Were your comments, the specific words or the overall mood of it, coordinated with Berlin?
You are asking me if I’m a professional? [Laughs] Of course they were. An ambassador, if he has a minimum amount of brain, never speaks outside his government’s position. And of course, that was the case.
But I want to bring that I did not call the whole Lithuanian debate “corrosive and harmful”. Quite the contrary. I said, in a democracy there will always be public debates and political debates about interesting things.
The sensitive spot was not that there was a debate, it was that the debate was suffused with mistrust. And it implied or sometimes stated that Germany wasn’t willing to fulfil its commitments. That was the detrimental spot, I said that twice in my Seimas comments, and that’s very important to understand.
I would never want to interfere in or stop a legitimate public debate in a democratic partner country. That would be really stupid.
But the debate was coming from several prominent politicians. Did you get the same messages in your private conversations with these politicians or their institutions? Or was it just their public statements, while in their conversations with you they were saying something else?
Honestly, I have nothing new to say on the domestic Lithuanian debate.
My focus in this conversation with you is what we are doing. What are we working on. And there is a lot. […]
We have a bilateral issue and it is probably the central issue of our cooperation right now. The working groups of the two defence ministries and their subgroups are coming together, I think the next subgroup is already this month here in Vilnius. That is the subgroup working in greater detail on the schedule of military exercises.
And there will also be, at the political level, another exchange this month. The defence political directors of the three Baltic Framework Nations and the three Baltic nations have already had a meeting in Berlin last year.
And the actual military exercise schedule is taking up full steam. […] Already in October, we had the first exercise that was one battalion size, on top of the existing eFP battle group, which is strengthened and stays strengthened currently at about 1,600 soldiers and of those, about 1,000 German troops.
In between, we always have smaller command post exercises. And then the next big one with troops will be in February-March, where the overall troop number will be about the same size as the eFP battle group. […]
And then the big exercise will be in June and July, just before and during the [NATO] summit [in Vilnius]. And that will be more than the eFP battle group, about the size of the Lithuanian Iron Wolf Brigade.
That’s still not a permanent deployment in Lithuania.
That is rotational.
But is the brigade assigned to Lithuania?
Yes, that brigade has already been assigned, I think in August or September last year. Its task within the German army, within NATO’s planning, and within Lithuanian defence planning is to defend Lithuania. It has no other task.
So that’s how Berlin understands the communiqué that was signed between your chancellor and our president?
It wasn’t signed, by the way, it’s a communiqué . Everybody always says this, Lithuanian politicians love saying, oh they signed this. No, it is a leaders’ joint statement.
So is there any document that’s going to be signed on this issue?
The assignation is a German national decision. That was done immediately afterwards, we decided the 41st armoured battalion of the first tank division would be the brigade assigned.
It will, by the way, change this summer, where it will be handed over to the Armoured Grenadier Brigade 12. Usually this kind of handover is a desktop event, the command goes from one general to the other. This time it will be in a physical combat exercise. I think the German armed forces haven’t done this for 20 years at least. This is being done here.
So Germany thinks that this is enough of a commitment in proving that they are ready to help defend Lithuania?
It is being built up continuously and will be. I have already mentioned, it has and will have to be kept in line with NATO planning as far as possible. We don’t mind being a little ahead with Lithuania on other parts of the eastern flank. But we do have to keep in mind that for NATO, the Baltic region is one area to defend. And so this harmonisation of military planning and what we are exercising and doing is an ongoing process.
And it goes, of course, in parallel with the enormous efforts of Lithuania in strengthening its infrastructure. Right now, as you well know and everybody in Lithuania admits, the infrastructure of Lithuania would not be able to accommodate a full brigade, that’s more than 5,000 soldiers over a permanent or longer period of time.
And so this is a process where every bit needs to fit together with the other, things are developing, and that’s being worked on. But personally, I think this is really impressive, if you just look at this calendar of exercises for the first half of the year and the number of German soldiers who will be here and will become familiar with the terrain that they are meant together with the Lithuanian army to defend. I personally find it quite impressive.
It's the best that can be done now.
But if and when the infrastructure is brought up to such a capacity, do you imagine Germany would be willing to commit a full brigade being stationed here in the future?
I would not want to speculate on that.
I may say one more thing, because that reminded me, when you said that there was a joint communiqué signed. I think many people don’t quite see what a leaders’ joint statement is. It is an expression of political will. And the implementation of this is something which involves politics, but also the experts, the military people, and so on.
Politics in the sense that, in a democracy, there’s always the democratic control of the armed forces. In Lithuania’s case a little more the president, in Germany’s case more the parliament and through it, the government. But there are many things and many players that have to be kept in line with each other. And that’s not something for a leader statement. A leader statement expresses a joint political will and will then be fleshed out by action and action plans.
Whenever the infrastructure is ready – that also is something that the leaders’ statement says – there is going to be pre-positioning of ammunition and materiel in Lithuania to facilitate the activation of this brigade, in line with the development of the available infrastructure.
But beyond that, my horizon does not go beyond this year or so, I would not want to speculate what exactly is going to be done. What you can rely on is that the work will continue, the strengthening of the eastern flank in Lithuania will continue, and that Lithuania and Germany will do it together.
Still, there is now talk about a legislative proposal in the Seimas that would somehow commit Germany to permanently stationing troops here. Are there any negotiations, any space for any compromise on the question?
Honestly, what needs to be done now is work between the two governments and the two militaries.
For this legislation issue, I don’t even know if that is still on the table. I read about it in the media, nobody has ever taken this up with me directly from the Lithuanian side. You are the first one to raise the question.
My answer is very short. Imagine the German Bundestag legislating about what Lithuania is supposed to be doing. How would that fly in Lithuania? I don’t think I want to say anything else. I don’t think much is to come with this.
So how has this whole situation, the debate, been perceived in Germany?
You know, political debates, ideas come up, they’re being discussed. Nobody got excited about it, honestly, it was hardly noticed.
There wasn’t any irritation?
No. It never reached the stage where it could have caused [dissatisfaction] and it would have been a mild form of not astonishment, but wrinkling your forehead and saying, really?
But in the beginning of our conversation you said that your statements in the Seimas were coordinated with Berlin. So somebody at least knew what was happening here?
Yes, but I don’t think that this idea of legislation was even a part of that.
In general, how did the Lithuanian public discussion about the brigade register with the German public and politicians, how did they hear about it?
You know, my embassy’s job was to factually report about Lithuanian political debates, just to let people in Berlin understand what goes on. And that’s what we did. So I think it was perceived in a realistic way.
That didn’t affect the German-Lithuanian relations?
No, I don’t think so. That’s another thing that is perhaps not bad to restate: This is a common interest of Lithuania and Germany. This is alliance defence. Germany is not doing this to do anybody a favour. This is to defend ultimately ourselves, here in Lithuania and together with other allies, but mostly together with Lithuania.
And this common interest is expressed very concretely in our leaders’ document, which is I think well negotiated on both sides. It has exactly the right level of specificity, but also is general enough to be a leaders’ statement. And this is an expression of the joint interest and the joint political will.
That will not be affected by any political debates. […]
But in the same speech you said that you were unhappy about the state of the German image here in Lithuania. What had contributed to this? Was it just the brigade question or more things, Germany’s support for Ukraine, for example, which was also seen here in Lithuania, as in Germany, as sometimes slow?
That is, of course, a perception that is widely shared elsewhere. That’s not a Lithuanian speciality, so to speak. And that has to do with Germany being a big country and a democracy with a consensus culture, that requires long discussion about most things, even where you and I might say, well, this is totally obvious. That’s the first factor, political debate in Germany takes time.
Since Russia started its war of aggression against Ukraine, Germany’s politics has been amazingly fast. I will just remind you that since the war started, Germany has, for example, managed to reduce its market share for Russian gas from about 50 percent to zero, within five–six months. Which in a way retrospectively shows that we weren’t as dependent on Russian gas as everybody thought we were.
And the first step was – something that was not really seen very clearly in Lithuania at the time – by nationalising all Rosneft and Gazprom assets in Germany. That happened already in April or May. Germany can do it. And the federal chancellor led in his speech about the Zeitenwende, turn of the era, on February 27, three days after the war started. And that’s exactly what we're doing.
And now we come to the other point I wanted to make. We don’t communicate very well about it. The perception that Germany is slow and reluctant and doesn’t lead is partly due to not very skilful communication on our side. It’s our fault. but it is not always the slowness of what we do, it is often the lack of communication skills.
So do you think now Germany will continue to support Ukraine and provide heavier and heavier weapons?
The commitment is very clearly declared, what that means in individual bits, operational bits is always being debated. We’re a big democracy, our government is a coalition government where three parties have to find a consensus. But the commitment is here: as much as necessary, as long as necessary. And Germany will carry its share.
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