“Any military conflict causes major repercussions throughout today’s interconnected global world,” says European Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius. The European Union (EU) should therefore aim to prevent escalation – but how consistently does it apply the principle in relations with the US, China or Israel?
In an interview with LRT.lt, Andrius Kubilius also discusses the EU’s strategy in Ukraine – what should be done if the US withdraws from the ranks of Kyiv’s supporters, how Europe sees the outcome of the war, and whether it still has any leverage to achieve the desired outcome.
The current European Commission is focused on rearming Europe. It envisages investing €800 billion in defence. However, most of this money will have to be borrowed by member states themselves. While this may be less of a problem for, say, Germany, what about countries such as Spain, Italy and France, that are already much deeper in debt and have much higher borrowing costs?
It is probably a matter for each country to decide what to prioritise in their spending.
The opportunities for countries to borrow, to take advantage of European loans or of the flexibilities in the deficit calculation are now very vast. From what I have heard, some countries are certainly planning to make quite significant use of these opportunities. Other countries may have to look for other options.
We cannot say for everybody what they should do, but it is a fact that there is certainly a lot more money coming in for defence than there has been so far. <...>
A country like Spain felt the effects of climate change very painfully last year and needs investment in green transition and climate mitigation. How are you to persuade the Spanish people to go further into debt in order to arm themselves against a threat they may not even feel?
This is a question of politicians and leaders taking responsibility. They have to find ways of convincing their electorate that there is a real need to invest in defence.
Europe relies on collective defence. We are dependent on other countries investing in their own defence because, according to all NATO defence plans, we need to have a defence capability that allows us to stand for ten days or so before NATO forces arrive. And what constitutes a NATO force? It’s the Spaniards, the Italians.
Mostly the Americans, though.
Yes, but in the long-term perspective, naturally, the American presence in European defence is likely to become smaller, as the Americans concentrate more on the Indo-Pacific.
We need to prepare for this, and countries have a duty to invest in their defence. This requires a very clear strategic understanding from leaders and heads of state, and real decisions.
In reality, however, NATO is built on the US commitment to defend European countries. If the Americans leave, will not things fall apart? Especially if we keep pressing the southern European countries to shift resources to defence?
What is the alternative? Not to defend ourselves? If indeed the world is moving in a direction where Russia is the biggest threat today.
Is that really the consensus? We in Eastern Europe may see it as the biggest threat, but do the southern Europeans?
Well, I can’t say how they see it there, but what different Eurobarometer polls show is that Europeans are quite unanimous in their support for Europe taking much more care of its defence.
What threats do the Spanish see? Naturally, they may not see the Russian threat as acutely as we do, although it is quite clear that if Russia were to launch an aggression against any NATO and EU country, the whole of Europe would suffer – economically, financially and so on.
But there is a lot of concern [in Spain] about threats from the south, from Africa. Again, if we look at the assessments of the Spaniards or the Italians themselves, they see that Russia is very actively involved in increasing those threats from the south.
The shared understanding that there are threats both in the south and in the north is precisely what is driving European leaders to speak with complete unanimity in favour of the programmes that the Commission has now proposed. There were no objections or abstentions in approving those financial programmes. This shows that the understanding is strong enough. [...]
What should the EU’s relationship with the US be in the future, both in military and economic terms? Should the Europeans buy defence systems from America or make them themselves?
There are two questions here: one short-term, the other longer-term. In the short term, I think it is very important to avoid emotional, chaotic, angry arguments.
And in the longer term, we need to be aware of a steady decline in US involvement in European security, and we need to be ready to shoulder the responsibility for European security.
I keep repeating the figures: 450 million Europeans should not be begging 340 million Americans to protect Europe from 140 million Russians who cannot take on 38 million Ukrainians.
However, the Americans are putting pressure on the Europeans to buy their defence systems. Should we resist the pressure?
There are several things here. First, we need to understand that, in defence matters, industry is a strategic resource. And we need to develop our defence industry.
Even American Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth said so when he visited NATO headquarters in Brussels in February: Europe needs to shoulder the responsibility for conventional defence, Europe needs to shoulder the responsibility for supporting Ukraine and, third, Europe needs to take care of its defence industry. That is what we are doing.
Up to now, when Europeans were buying weapons, only 20% of their purchases were coming from European industry, while over 65% were coming from the US – that is a very clear indication that we are not investing our own money in the development of our own production.
We need to change that and do it consistently. There will be no leaps and bounds. There are weapons that we do not produce in Europe that we will continue to buy from those countries that do, whether it is the US or South Korea, from which, for example, the Poles buy a lot.
But alongside that, we need to develop our own production. This is our joint task, and that is what we are doing.
Further down the road, there will come up questions about the so-called European security architecture. What will it look like in 10 years? How many Americans will remain here? How will collective defence management work? There are many more questions, but we need to go about it gradually because it is far worse to be unprepared or to go into an angry and chaotic divorce with the Americans.
Until now, there’s been a presumed division in the EU on security: Eastern Europeans have preferred to keep the Americans close, while countries like France have long called for greater strategic autonomy for Europe. These calls were largely resisted by countries like Lithuania. Am I to understand that our position on this issue is shifting?
I am talking about the long term. The long-term perspective must come through rational agreements with the Americans.
Is that possible with the current US administration?
I think anything is possible. Rationality is the quality that life forces onto you.
And we have to know what to avoid even in such circumstances. As I’ve said, we have to avoid a chaotic divorce.
Second, we need to see the long-term perspective: whether we want to keep the Americans in Europe or not, [...] they are focused on China’s growing military power. From this we have to assume that they will concentrate their capabilities there. [...]
And it is better for us to come up with a clear plan of what we want from the Americans over the next decade, avoid chaos, than to be constantly begging them to stay and be completely unprepared and then face a full-scale crisis.
And what should the European Union’s relationship with China be?
Well, China is, like Russia, an authoritarian state.
The EU has good relations with a number of authoritarian states.
There is a big difference between those authoritarian states that because of their size and geopolitical weight do not try to become aggressive. But there are states such as Russia that are authoritarian and aggressive and therefore pose a great danger.
What is the danger to Europe from China?
There is perhaps no direct threat to Europe, but it has quite an aggressive policy around itself, towards Taiwan. [...]
Our interest is simple. Any military conflict causes major repercussions throughout today’s interconnected global world. The sheer scale of the situation that could arise if China decided to be aggressive towards Taiwan, given how much semiconductor technology depends on Taiwanese production, is such that we can only imagine how this would affect the whole world. [...]
Here, on the European continent, support for Ukraine would show not only Russia but also China that the West is strong and that it does not tolerate aggression.
Could you imagine that the current tensions with the US could bring Europe closer to China, first in trade and then perhaps politically?
Trade is a slightly different matter, and I cannot say what that might be. But all the problems that the Europeans have been raising with China about human rights violations, about Taiwan, those problems will not be forgotten.
On the subject of aggression, what is or should be the European Union’s policy towards the Middle East, where Israel’s actions are destabilising the region?
This requires, first of all, that the Middle East abandon terrorism as an instrument for implementing policy. Israel is fighting for its security.
It is also, as many argue, using terrorist methods against a population that is under occupation.
There’s a lot to say here, but the history of Israel is that it had to fight at least three wars against neighbouring countries intent on destroying it, proclaiming this as their consistent doctrine. So the country is reacting to this by defending itself. Sometimes, perhaps not all methods are appropriate, but in seeking a solution, one must ask where the solution must start.
I believe that one of the most important steps would be for the countries of the region to decide that they will no longer tolerate terrorist actions against Israel. In that case, it would also be possible to raise the question of Israeli action. But it all starts with very clear decisions.
One thing that we can commend the former term of President Trump for is the so-called Abraham Accords between the Arab countries and Israel. They were the path that could have led to a completely different situation. But it caused resentment among the terrorist groups funded by Iran, and so the attack by Gaza on the people of Israel (in October 2023) was precisely an attempt to destroy the path towards a normal peace.
It is therefore my conviction that, until a solution is found to rid the region of terrorism, there will be no lasting solutions. Israel will defend itself. And it has every right to defend itself against terrorism. [...]
So you find Israel’s actions perfectly justifiable?
Well, I’m not saying that every action is justifiable. I am talking about the situation as a whole, which is created precisely by the circumstances in which Israel has to defend itself against the incessant efforts to destroy it.
It is Israel that is now moving towards the total destruction of the population in Gaza.
Well, I can’t say how that can be addressed when a large part of the Gazan population has been hostage to those same squads, terrorist squads, that are organising attacks against Israel. The fight against terrorism is, unfortunately, not that simple.
And if, as Israel claims, there were tens of thousands of real terrorists in Gaza and 200,000 of their supporters, then the question is why this happened. Where are the roots, where were the historical mistakes made, on both sides perhaps?
Should Europe impose sanctions on Israel?
There are many different opinions on this, but I believe that Europe should focus much more on a long-term solution and not look for easy solutions now. And it has to answer the strategic questions for itself as to whether what has been tried so far is working. If it is not – why, and what can be the long-term solutions? [...]
Let's look at our region. Does the European Union have a plan in place in case the US pulls out of the peace talks in Ukraine, as it has been threatening to do for some time?
Europe has its own clear vision of what needs to be achieved in these negotiations, and Europe stands very firmly on Ukraine’s side. There is no doubt in Europe who is the aggressor and who is the victim. And it has been made very clear that Europe will never recognise occupied territories.
So if the Americans withdraw, whether just from negotiations or also from supporting Ukraine, then solutions will have to be found.
Only then will we start looking for solutions? Should we not have had a plan earlier?
Well, there are plans and there are options.
What plans are being considered?
First of all, we need to look at the support that has been provided so far. Although the American administration brags that they have been just about the only donors, it is worth remembering that America has provided €60 billion in military aid over three years, and the European Union about €50 billion. But if we include Britain and Norway, Europe’s figure is also about 60 billion.
So the support is comparable. The annual support is about €20 billion. [...] Twenty billion on the European side and 20 billion on the American side is less than 0.1% of GDP for both. So when you look at those figures, you realise: we are spending 3% or 3.5% on our own defence, and we are spending less than 0.1% on the defence of Ukraine.
That is understandable – we are not at war, this is not our war.
How come it is not our war? We understand that if Ukraine loses, the threats to us are much greater. I still miss this strategic understanding, both among Europeans and among Americans.
How realistic is it to achieve that understanding in time for Ukraine to survive as a state?
That is something we need to strive for constantly. Not only the EU Commissioners, but also Lithuanian politicians must do it.
We have been doing it for three years now. So what is the plan?
The plan is to continue what we are doing and to increase support. There is now the possibility, with the €150 billion loan mechanism, for member states to use these loans together with Ukraine, and thus to open up many more opportunities to strengthen Ukraine’s military power, its military industry.
We will see how much the member states will take advantage of this. That again depends on the decision of the countries. Lithuania could be a good example for all the others. [...]
So the plan, I take it, is to keep building up military capabilities and to try to push Russia out of the occupied territories? How long can that take?
First of all, we need to withstand pressure from Russia. Russia is not as powerful as it is sometimes thought to be, and I do not see any evidence of Russia’s great power.
Yes, Ukraine needs support. Yes, that support can come from the European Union together with America. Without America, too, we need to think about how we are going to do it, but there is no other way. What is the other way? [...]
It is really hard to say what will happen next, but let’s ask ourselves what the alternatives are. Ending the war by handing over seized territories to Russia, as some suggest? Then we will only encourage Putin’s aggression. To stop supporting Ukraine, supposedly for the sake of peace? That will amount to forcing Ukraine to surrender.
The answer is simple – continue the support, increase the pressure on Russia. That can be done. It requires a consensus between Americans and Europeans. What the American strategy will be, we may not yet be able to answer fully.
If it is such an important factor for our security, yet we cannot control it, perhaps we need to rethink our plans after all?
Yes, we can say that we need completely different plans.
What are they?
I just want to say that one has to be realistic. So what is the reality? Yes, three years of war. Ukraine, with the support of the West, has endured and that is a lot. Russia is not winning this war.
Where will the current processes, the American efforts for peace, the European efforts, lead? It is difficult to predict today. But that does not mean that we should condemn ourselves for not knowing anything. We are continuing what we have been doing for these three years and looking for new opportunities. Will they emerge and will they appear? Well...
Is it not the case that we are doing the same thing but expecting different results?
Of course, we expect different results. But you have to have very clear fundamentals. The first thing is a commitment to support Ukraine. There may be more voices for not supporting Ukraine. Russia is very capable of creating havoc through its hybrid means. Supporting Ukraine is the fundamental point.
Can we increase our support? I think we can, because I am not convinced that 0.1% of GDP is the limit. How to increase it? There are many different issues here. To what extent can the member states contribute by increasing their support, to what extent can they lead by example, to what extent can the various European instruments be used? There is still a lot of room for debate here. But it is good that, in the confusion caused by the new American administration, there is an effort in Europe to show much clearer leadership.
The interview was conducted on the margins of the European People’s Party Congress in Valencia, April 29. The journalist’s trip was financed by the organisers and did not affect the content of the interview.
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