The absence of a dominant hegemon is the defining difference between NATO and the EU and a major roadblock for European defence ambitions, argues Giedrius Česnakas. Ironically, a greater disparity in military power among EU member states – if, say, Germany, were to dramatically increase its defence funding – could actually enhance the EU’s military capabilities.
For the first time in its history, the European Union has appointed a defence commissioner who will soon publish a Defence White Paper. The possibility of an additional €800 billion in defence funding is raising hopes among states on the Eastern flank that the EU might finally assert itself as a geopolitical actor, significantly contributing to their defence capabilities. This move suggests progress towards becoming a genuine defence union, as envisioned under Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty. However, such aspirations are unlikely to be fully realised due to one fundamental issue – the EU lacks a European hegemon.
The absence of a dominant power is the defining difference between NATO and the EU. NATO functions effectively because of the leadership and military might of the United States, which has historically dictated the alliance’s direction, including the very wording of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The US has long acted as a benevolent hegemon, ensuring the security of Europe and Canada, and shaped the strategic landscape of the transatlantic region. NATO was attractive to new members because it provided deterrence by the US, gave the US hegemonic role, and allowed varying degrees of autonomy (as exemplified by France’s changing stance in NATO). Growing uncertainty about US commitments to the European allies pushes them to pursue parallel security cooperation.
This hegemonic dynamic continues to shape contemporary geopolitical realities. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 should have served as a wake-up call for European NATO allies to enhance their defence capabilities. Unfortunately, not the threat from an aggressive neighbour spurred action, but rather US insistence. At the 2014 NATO Wales Summit, then-President Barack Obama emphasised the necessity for member states to allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence. He reiterated this call in his 2016 Hannover speech. However, the most significant impetus for increased defence spending came from President Donald Trump, whose direct demands for fair burden-sharing served as a primary catalyst.
Even since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many European NATO members were still more responsive to the US pressure than to the actual threat. Finally, US President-elect Donald Trump began demanding European allies to spend 5% of GDP on defence. This paradox underscores the function of hegemony – the hegemon can alternate between persuasion and coercion, knowing that its allies must recognise their dependence on its unmatched military capabilities. Therefore, it has more power on the allies’ policies than external threats.
In contrast, the EU lacks such a hegemonic force, which significantly impairs its ability to function as a cohesive defence entity. While discussions about the EU’s success as the most integrated supranational organisation often focus on its consensus-based approach, effective defence policy necessitates centralised power – something the EU inherently lacks.
Military power among EU member states is distributed more evenly than in NATO. While France and Germany possess the most significant military capabilities (with France uniquely having nuclear weapons) in Europe, their power gap compared to other EU members is much smaller than the gap between the US and the second-largest defence investor in NATO – Germany.
For instance, US defence spending surpasses Germany’s by a factor of ten. In contrast, Germany’s military expenditure is only 34% higher than France’s (the second biggest investor in the EU in nominal terms), and only 3 times the size of Poland’s, which is the fourth biggest investor in defence in the EU. This distribution means that no single country can unilaterally shape EU defence policies, creating a necessity for a complex web of negotiations and consensus-building that slows decision-making and dilutes outcomes.
Domestic political constraints and strategic divergences further exacerbate the structural weakness. Intergovernmental negotiations and domestic political shifts in each member state ultimately shape defence policy in the EU. The greater the number of actors involved, the greater the challenge to reach ambitious agreements, and the more opportunities for individual actors to block progress.
Another critical issue is the disparity in threat perception across member states. Countries on the EU’s eastern flank, which have direct historical experience with Russian aggression, witnessing Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, prioritise common borrowing for investments in defence and defence industry and collective security measures. Conversely, nations like Belgium or Spain, which perceive a lower immediate threat from Russia, are less inclined to make substantial defence investments.
This divergence complicates efforts to establish a unified defence policy and secure adequate funding for capability development. Furthermore, for countries on the Eastern flank, a constellation of middle-sized powers and small powers, a wide web of negotiations in the EU and other formats, requires much diplomatic effort to get relatively small returns. The sheer number of negotiation formats and different scopes sharply contrasts with NATO, where a single hegemon – the US – can drive policy more effectively. Engaging with the hegemon is significantly more cost-efficient and requires less labour.
Under President Emmanuel Macron, France has sought to assume leadership in EU defence matters, advocating for European strategic autonomy. However, France lacks the military resources and financial backing to serve as the EU’s defence pillar. Crucially, France’s nuclear doctrine does not explicitly extend a “nuclear umbrella” over the entire EU, highlighting another limitation to its potential leadership role. France cannot serve as the security cornerstone of a European defence framework without a fully articulated nuclear guarantee.
Ultimately, while the EU may make incremental progress in defence policy, the process will be slow, arduous, and yield limited results. This is not necessarily due to a lack of political will but rather the structural constraints of power distribution. Ironically, a greater disparity in military power among EU member states – where one country, such as Germany, dramatically increases its defence funding – could actually enhance the EU’s defence capabilities.
If Germany were to invest 3% of its GDP in defence, it would not only bolster its military but also create a significant power gap within the EU, granting it greater influence over European defence policy. Interestingly, this would yield better relations with countries that are more ambitious about their defence and incentivise others to contribute more, thus providing more for a common defence.
In the absence of a hegemon, the EU’s journey toward becoming a formidable defence entity remains an uphill battle, requiring extensive coordination and compromises. Without a clear leader leading by example, the EU will struggle to overcome the inertia of consensus-driven decision-making, limiting its ability to act decisively in security and defence matters.
Assoc. Prof. Giedrius Česnakas is an adviser to the minister of defence of Lithuania. The position of the author does not represent the official position of the Ministry of Defense.
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