The Russian military in Ukraine suffered a severe blow last week in Crimea, sparking enthusiasm that the tide in the war might be turning. Lithuania’s former chief of defence, Lieutenant General Valdas Tutkus, says such optimism might be premature.
Although the Ukrainian forces have had big successes in the region of Kherson – where they have blown up bridges, putting the Russian forces in a precarious situation – Kyiv does not have the capacity to launch a large-scale counter-offensive, Tutkus says in an interview to LRT TV.
Moreover, the war may be entering a protracted phase where neither side could achieve a decisive victory on the ground. A solution, Tutkus believes, may therefore require an intervention from a third party that could push through a ceasefire and make the two sides stick to it.
After the Ukrainian military’s successful strikes in Crimea and Kherson, can we speak of a turning point in the war?
The strikes were undoubtedly very successful and very timely, but I’m a little sceptical that they represent some sort of a breakthrough.
In military terms, Ukraine is today in a perfect position to launch a counter-offensive because bridges [in Kherson] have been destroyed and the [Crimean] airbase is currently ineffective too. But my impression is that Ukraine does not have the capacity to do so at the moment.
It is therefore too optimistic to talk about a breakthrough, although, of course, I would very much like to see one.
When you say that Ukraine does not have the capacity to launch a counter-offensive, do you mean in terms of manpower or military hardware?
Probably both. There is not enough manpower. Let’s not forget that Ukraine has a very difficult situation in the east, where the Russians have concentrated their forces and are having some success. Not as much as they would like, but success nonetheless.
And in the Kherson area, clearly, Ukraine is having some success, also not as much, but some success nonetheless. In Kherson, I would say that the Russian and Ukrainian forces are evenly matched, while an offensive requires advantage of at least 3-4 times.
And when it comes to the city of Kherson itself, there are several nuances here. First, Ukraine does not really have the capacity to occupy Kherson, maybe to bypass it.
The second point is purely moral. Will Ukraine bomb its own city the same way that the Russians bombed Ukrainian cities? Apparently not. Taking Kherson itself is problematic. One could try to encircle it, but I do not think Ukraine has the capacity to do so at the moment.
What about Crimea? Crimea has been occupied by the Russians since 2014. And they now control significant territory around it. How could the Ukrainians have hit that airbase in Crimea with missiles? Granted, they have not admitted it was them, but do they have the capacity? If not, who hit the airbase?
I suppose there are several options. It’s pretty clear to me why the Russians would say that it was an accident. Because they cannot and will not admit to such a big failure – and it is a huge failure for the Russian army.
And why the Ukrainian side does not take responsibility for the success of the operation is difficult to say. The American HIMARS missiles, some of which can fly up to 300 kilometres, would be sufficient. However, the Americans claim that these systems have not been provided to Ukraine.
Therefore, let us stick to the assumption that [the Ukrainians don’t have HIMARS missiles] and accordingly, a missile fire from Ukraine is unlikely. In practice, there could have been, I would say, a well-organised diversionary operation because I personally do not believe in accidents. Plus, as a general, I prefer to think that this is a successful operation by the Ukrainian army.
The Ukrainian army announces that about one-fifth of the Russian troops that invaded and fought in Ukraine have been destroyed. Is this a significant loss? Is it difficult for the Russians to recover from such losses, or does it not hurt them very much?
Of course, it hurts. Frankly, a fifth of the group lost is painful. However, people who think that Russia is exhausted are, I think, a little too optimistic. I do not think that is the case.
There are a few things to bear in mind. The first thing is that Russia has its own specificities and its own psychology of warfare and its own next steps. They do not care about losses. The worst thing is that they do not care about the human cost. And they do not care about the loss of weapons.
And Russia still has enough capability. Let’s not forget that they haven’t even started mobilisation. In the same way, they have enough armaments in their warehouses, albeit somewhat outdated ones. So I do not think that the losses incurred so far will make a fundamental difference to the Russian offensive.
Some war analysts and British intelligence say that all the indications are that this war will be a long one and that it has already entered the long phase. What is your prediction for the short term? Do you agree that the war will be protracted?
Predictions are problematic in these things. But I would probably agree with the British analysts and with other analysts who see a rather protracted phase of the war.
I have a lot of friends who are fighting on the Ukrainian side. The level of hatred between the Ukrainians who are defending themselves and the Russians have reached an intensity that will not go down by itself. And I do not see any practical preconditions for peace talks either. The reason is that Ukraine cannot accept the surrender of the occupied territories, and Russia cannot accept the surrender of the territories it successfully occupied.
In my view, it is only the intervention of a powerful third party – as in the case of grain exports – that can make them call a truce. But the truce will not stop the fire.
In other words, are you saying that it is not developments on the ground that will determine the outcome of the war, but what we need is an intervention of diplomats and politicians?
Absolutely. Let us start by saying that war is a continuation of politics by other means. The war will only end through a political agreement. Which may not be to the liking of the belligerents, but they’ll have to stick to it.
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