Recently appointed Director of Lithuania’s State Security Department (VSD), Remigijus Bridikis, like many intelligence officers, is not one to chatter. When he does speak, he chooses his words carefully.
Intelligence officers typically break their silence to warn citizens not to fall prey to Russian or Belarusian operatives, or to avoid travelling to hostile states where personal safety can never be guaranteed.
This time, as Russia continues to successfully recruit people across Europe to carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism, the Director of the State Security Department has offered rare insight into how the Kremlin selects its operatives – and what drives people to carry out crimes on its behalf.
Bridikis warned that once apprehended by Lithuanian law enforcement, Russia swiftly abandons its agents, leaving them to face serious consequences. After all, these individuals are not tried for petty crimes such as arson or vandalism – but for actions against the state, which often result in lengthy prison sentences.
“It’s not ethnicity that drives people to take part in criminal activity orchestrated by a foreign state – nor is it ideology. Even social background is not a decisive factor. The key motivator is financial. It’s a very banal reason – a simple way to make money. Easy money,” Bridikis told LRT.lt.
You were appointed as Director earlier this spring, but you served as Deputy Director for ten years. How does it feel stepping into your new role?
It has now been 100 days in this new position. I clearly outlined my priorities and my vision for the institution’s future. The first steps are crucial – ensuring continuity in ongoing investigations and operational work is paramount.
Another key element has been building partnerships, both domestically and internationally. I had an intense period of meetings with the heads of partner institutions, discussing cooperation, future plans, and prospects.
I met with the Commander of the Armed Forces to discuss our institution’s role in defence – how and in what capacity we can support the military during complex scenarios and potential risks or threats in times of armed conflict. We’ve identified ourselves as an active participant in national defence, committed to fulfilling our role during peace, war, or crisis.
But surely cooperation with the Armed Forces, military intelligence, and other institutions is routine? What’s new?
In one sense, nothing is new – we’ve done this before. Cooperation with other intelligence services is natural and an everyday part of our work. However, given the geopolitical climate and the emerging threats, we see additional opportunities to enhance collaboration, especially in transitioning from peacetime to wartime environments. These are the forms of cooperation we’ve been discussing.
Prosecutors have brought a case to court in which three non-Lithuanian citizens are accused of desecrating the monument of partisan leader Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas in Merkinė. Why is Russia pursuing such actions? Lithuanians will not stop remembering the partisan resistance to Soviet occupation, regardless of vandalism.
The crime itself, in my view, is significant. We cannot dismiss it based on the target – even if the material damage seems minimal. One of the aims of the Russian regime services is to attack our historical memory, the legacy of our resistance, and our self-perception as an independent Western state. They aim to subjugate our minds, hearts, and consciousness. This is not a mere domestic criminal act – it’s the execution of another state's design. Whoever commits such acts becomes part of a broader Russian campaign. Russia is attempting to influence the minds and hearts of our country and others in the region.
And from such seemingly minor assignments, operatives may progress to more complex and deadly operations. It’s akin to mafia structures – one starts with small jobs and eventually gets what one deserves.
The pre-trial investigation is now complete. Could you share what you can about the case? Two of the accused hold Estonian and Russian citizenship, and one holds only Russian citizenship, so they were likely not regular visitors to Lithuania.
One must understand that intelligence work is never carried out in isolation – it is done alongside domestic and international partners. The success of such operations always stems from cooperation. First and foremost, the key is recognising the threat – understanding what the enemy is about – and then piecing together the small clues with partners to form the full picture. That way, we can identify not only the perpetrators but also the planners and those who commissioned the acts. The end result is usually straightforward – the information is handed over to law enforcement, be it in Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, or Poland.
This particular crime marked the beginning of a concerted campaign against European states. The principle is clear: using criminal means to influence public consciousness, sow distrust in our institutions, and cast doubt on our ability to recognise threats or to cooperate. The campaign progressed to arson, and in some cases, murder or attempted murder.
Previously, we had similar activity – hoax bomb threats to schools and institutions. If you include cyberattacks, we are witnessing a full spectrum of tactics used by hostile states. This is a comprehensive information operations campaign against us, our country, and the wider region.
Since you mentioned arson and sabotage targeting Lithuania and other Western states, I’ve noticed that perpetrators include citizens of Estonia, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland, but few Lithuanians. One exception is Ugnius Ašmena, who was named in a UK case involving arson attacks on Ukraine-linked businesses, reportedly carried out on behalf of the Wagner Group. Why are so few Lithuanian nationals implicated? Is there a particular reason for this?
I wouldn’t say there are no Lithuanian nationals involved. In the broader picture, we do come across Lithuanian names or individuals of Lithuanian origin in certain contexts. But regardless of nationality, it’s not ethnicity that drives people to take part in criminal activity orchestrated by a foreign state – nor is it ideology. Even social background is not a decisive factor. The key motivator is financial. It’s a very banal reason – a simple way to make money. Easy money.
Not so easy once they’re caught.
People perhaps don’t realise what they’re getting into. Regarding the vandalism of monuments, some think they’re committing a minor, low-impact offence. But from a wider perspective, they’re engaging in a form of societal terror. They are being paid.
From what we’ve heard from law enforcement, the fees paid to these operatives are not especially large.
Of course not. But individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds, without a stable income, may be prone to criminality. Some are simply opportunists. An important factor is the information space they inhabit. Most of these recruitment efforts take place on Russian-language social networks. So, to receive such an assignment, one must understand Russian. That’s a significant factor. Typically, they are approached in Russian.
It's difficult to generalise, of course, but do these individuals usually realise they’re working for a foreign state?
It varies, not necessarily. But usually, they’re aware they’re committing a crime. Whether they realise it’s on behalf of a foreign government is clarified during investigations. Still, whoever the perpetrators are, they must understand that these kinds of offences attract intense scrutiny from our intelligence and law enforcement agencies, both in Lithuania and beyond. These are not ordinary offences – they are crimes against the state, ordered by another state. And they are judged accordingly. The money they hope to earn is not worth spending ten or more years in prison.
It’s also important to note that such people are treated as disposable when subject to hostile services. No one will come to their aid once they’re compromised. They’ll be left to ponder their future behind bars.
Since Russia began its war in Ukraine, its intelligence services have adopted particularly aggressive tactics against Western states and societies. Israel’s intelligence services have also acted aggressively in targeting Iran’s nuclear programme, even assassinating scientists involved. But Western intelligence agencies, at least on the surface, seem less aggressive – or their actions are highly discreet. During the Cold War, the CIA was involved in regime change in several countries. Why do the West’s services appear more restrained today?
The actions and methods of Russian services and the Kremlin regime are inconsistent with how we typically understand the work of intelligence agencies. Assassinations, poisonings, the targeting of civilian infrastructure, setting fires, bomb threats to nursery schools, even operations that endanger the lives of commercial airline passengers... take, for example, the downing of civilian aircraft – whether over Azerbaijan or the Malaysian airliner shot down over Ukraine – these methods resemble acts of terror rather than lawful actions against legitimate targets.
Western services operate differently, but the public sees only a fraction of what happens behind the scenes. That hidden work is active and intensive. I can’t speak about the methods, because disclosing them would only create more problems for us to contain. But I can assure you that Western intelligence operations are coordinated and, I believe, effective. Without them, we’d be facing far more fires and other incidents, as the hostile side’s plans are also extensive and quite aggressive.
So, if I understand you correctly, you are saying that through preventative action, you stop more incidents – such as arson or bombings – from occurring. If so, could you give us a sense of proportion – how many incidents are prevented?
I wouldn’t define it in percentages. But I would say that what we see publicly is just the tip of the iceberg. And such crimes have no geographic boundaries. This is a broad operation across Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area. The aim is to undermine Western thinking, decision-making, and resolve to support Ukraine in its war against the aggressor. They want to cloud our judgement—to make us doubt what we see and doubt our future.
The Belarusian regime has initiated talks with the United States and released a number of political prisoners. Naturally, this raises questions about sanctions, particularly against Belaruskalij, lifted or eased. Lithuania’s national security assessment mentions that Belarus is engaged in lobbying efforts within the EU and Lithuania, and that Belaruskalij is attempting to maintain its business ties. Are there risks that the Belarusian regime could achieve favourable outcomes – legally or illegally?
I’d return to the origins of these sanctions: Belaruskalij is one of the main sources of funding for the Belarusian regime. It’s natural that they would seek to restore the privileges they once enjoyed. Belarus is trying to project the image that it deserves different treatment than it currently receives.
But the sanctions weren’t imposed on a whim by the EU – they were a response to the regime’s repressive actions against its own people, the imprisonment of dissenters, the forced diversion of a civilian airliner to Minsk, and Belarus's participation in the war against Ukraine. Not to mention the abduction of our citizens – something highlighted by the [Lithuanian] Foreign Minister. This is a whole spectrum of actions incompatible with Western values. And let’s not forget: the sanctions were a collective decision.
The Defence Minister reassigned the head of military intelligence, Colonel Elegijus Paulavičius, to the reserve before the end of his term, deciding not to nominate him for a second one. An internal inquiry was held regarding his behaviour towards subordinates. The decision caused outrage in the Seimas [Lithuanian Parliament] National Security and Defence Committee, and your former colleague, now Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys, noted that the matter reached our international partners and urged caution. How did you view this development? Could it affect our cooperation with foreign partners?
I won’t deny that I received inquiries from colleagues abroad. I responded then as I do now: we had a warm working relationship with the former commander. We had no issues with his professionalism, conduct, or competence. The rest falls under the purview of the Ministry of Defence. It’s not for us to comment. But I’m confident that whoever takes up the post next will meet the necessary criteria.
More broadly, we maintain excellent relations with our colleagues in military intelligence and expect that to continue. Institutional continuity and a smooth handover of duties are crucial for all intelligence services – and, indeed, for any institution. That’s the key. We’ve noticed no disruption; operations continue as normal. Everything else lies outside our mandate.
Since you’ve served in the Special Operations Forces, I assume you know the proposed new military intelligence chief, Mindaugas Mažonas?
I know my former colleague Mažonas well. We’ve served together in various capacities. Beyond that, I’ll let him speak for himself. If he’s chosen, I assume he’s worthy of the role.
Many heads of intelligence seem to come from the Special Operations Forces. Why do you think that is?
I’m not sure I’d say 'many.'
You, former VSD Director Darius Jauniškis, and perhaps the incoming military intelligence chief M. Mažonas. That’s a fair few.
I suspect the selection isn’t based solely on that. Appointments to such positions are made by those in authority, who choose candidates based on merit and competence, weighing their background and experience. It’s a blend of many factors. I’m pleased to see people from Special Operations, but suitable candidates can come from other institutions too.
When you were appointed Director of the VSD, there were suspicions that your selection was not solely due to competence, but also because you gave testimony favourable to the President during a parliamentary inquiry. The committee had been investigating whether presidential candidate Gitanas Nausėda’s circle was lawfully scrutinised, and whether individuals connected to the Belarusian fertiliser trade had sought to influence him. Do you feel your appointment was motivated by anything other than your qualifications?
I know exactly what I testified. I presented facts, as I saw and understood them. I had no bias, no agenda then, nor do I now. I serve according to duty, with no partiality. I have no reason to suspect my selection was for any other reason. As I said, I simply testified to what happened.
There are growing concerns about levels of legal migration – though it is understood, to some extent, that Lithuania needs workers. The Migration Department recently decided to close the visa centre in Tajikistan. Are there similar concerns about other Central Asian countries? And what, specifically, went wrong with Tajikistan?
We’ve been consulting with the Ministry of the Interior and the Migration Department. These inter-institutional consultations are routine. Central Asia presents a unique situation – not necessarily strange, but with certain patterns.
Firstly, the region is home to the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province, a designated terrorist organisation. We’ve encountered instances where individuals seeking to enter Lithuania submitted false documents, deceiving even prospective employers.
There’s also a trend of migrants trying to overstay illegally after their residence permits expire, or moving on to Western Europe. This collection of factors forces us to reconsider our approach to labour migration from Tajikistan, specifically, and the region more broadly.
From our institution’s perspective, I can add that in the past couple of years, we’ve identified five individuals who posed a threat to national security and acted accordingly. A further five were declared persona non grata due to links with terrorist organisations. This is the context that led to the decision to close the visa centre in Tajikistan. In future, we’ll continue evaluating applicants from different regions carefully – national security must be a key consideration.
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