After pushing past anti-tank barriers, Ukrainian armoured columns moved into Russia, meeting only sporadic resistance from mostly conscripts along the way. As Lithuania begins to build its fortification line, what can Ukraine’s Kursk operation teach about defences?
A smiling Ukrainian soldier sits behind the wheel of his armoured vehicle, which slowly climbs over the remains of so-called Dragon’s Teeth barriers that were meant to stop Ukraine’s offensive.
The crew passes by a knocked-out Ukrainian armoured vehicle and an ambulance before passing by a destroyed Russian fortified position; the bunker’s firing arch sits idly amid bombed-out and scattered concrete blocks and tree stumps.
In summer 2023, Ukraine’s counterattack in the country’s occupied south was stopped by multiple layers of fortifications. Kyiv as well as foreign observers were putting the blame for the poor performance on the new brigades, the lack of air support, the pre-announced start of the attack, or all of the above.
All of this changed in Kursk.
"The first thing that helped was the surprise effect," a Ukrainian soldier who holds a senior position in one of the brigades involved in the attack told LRT.lt. He asked to remain anonymous because his unit does not publicly comment about the ongoing operation.
The successful launch of the operation was also marked an the extensive use of electronic warfare, which blocked Russian communications and drones, according to the Wall Street Journal which interviewed dozens of Ukrainian soldiers and Western officials.
Information hygiene and radio silence were also critical, with most of the units finding out just hours prior to the operation that they would be attacking Russia. The Ukrainian units, secretly massed along the border, struck at the easily defended Russian lines.
Video footage posted in the wake of the operation showed Ukrainian tanks and armoured vehicles equipped with demining equipment cutting their way through fields and gaps in the anti-tank barriers.
"A special mine clearance vehicle went in front, throwing a charge forward that blew up the mines. It was followed by other special vehicles that destroyed unexploded mines. Only then did the main force arrive," the soldier who took part in the attack told LRT.lt.
Meanwhile, Russian armoured vehicles retreated further north, according to the Wall Street Journal, leaving isolated conscripts in trenches and villages –often already behind Ukrainian forces. Another source close to one of the first Ukrainian units to cross the Kursk border confirmed to LRT.lt that the defensive line was not properly equipped and that the defences were mostly manned by conscripts.
Similarly, the lack of fortifications and minefields helped enable the Russian offensive in the Kharkiv area in May, which was eventually stopped in Vovchansk.
According to The Insider, an independent Russian investigative publication, conscripts were thrown into battle with as little as two magazines of ammunition.
"The commanders told us to hold out for one day," a conscript told a local Russian official whose phone call about the situation in Kursk was leaked and published by The Insider.
In the same conversation, the official revealed more details: the minefields were not set up and the army had failed to properly prepare anti-tank fortifications because it "wouldn't have anything to stop the Ukrainian tanks with anyway".
This led to dire consequences for the Russian conscripts.
"To flush Russian soldiers out of a fortified position near the border, the brigade pointed the barrel of a tank directly at it, forcing them to surrender," the Wall Street Journal wrote.
Twenty-nine soldiers emerged from the bunker holding their hands behind their heads.
Sceptics of fortifications fear exactly the same outcome in Lithuania, as the Baltic states and Poland construct their own defensive lines along the border with Russia and Belarus.
Lessons for Lithuania
The Kursk experience illustrates the argument between proponents and critics of building bunkers and trenches in Lithuania.
One side maintains that fortifications are critical in repelling an invasion and saving the lives of the infantry. Others, however, argue that static defences are pointless if they lack the troops and support units, including artillery and aviation, needed to defend them.
This seems to be the lesson that the Russian army has now faced.
According to the soldier interviewed by LRT.lt, the Ukrainian troops managed to bypass the Russian fortifications thanks to good prior reconnaissance and communications jamming.
"No matter how good the fortifications are, if there is no communication between the units and not enough people to man the defences, they are basically useless," he said.
According to the soldier, the conscripts and Federal Security Service (FSB) units, which are responsible for border protection, had little support from artillery or other units. The few units that were in place had to retreat as Ukrainian units would advance at least five kilometres a day, threatening to attack the support assets head-on.
A video by Yuriy Butuzov, a prominent Ukrainian analyst and war blogger, also showed destroyed trenches where Russian troops tried to hold out. "The garrison was destroyed in close combat," Butuzov said.
The Russians had set up trench lines of several layers, with one floor immediately above the other, soldiers who took part in the first wave of the Kursk offensive told Ukrainian Hromadske media.
But even this didn’t help much.
"If you want to protect the border, you have to mine it very well. It’s very effective, as you still have to demine [a path] if you want to advance, and doing it 'with our face' is very expensive," said the soldier interviewed by LRT.lt.
In Lithuania, public figures routinely call for the border to be mined. However, the Defence Minister has pledged to acquire mines and stockpile them in the so-called countermobility parks, which also house barriers and other fortifications. In case of a crisis, they would be moved into place, the Defence Ministry previously said.
"I can't say it's the most important thing, [but] it's one of the important components. It just holds back vehicles," the soldier said. "For example, in the direction of Zaporizhzhya it worked against us."
Last summer, his unit managed to advance in southern Ukraine, but the breakthrough was halted by multiple players of minefields and fortifications.
"The Russians have entire underground cities, one trench can stretch for kilometres," the soldier said.
But it is also a question of resources, he added.
"For example, they can dig some positions very close to the front line, they go there with their equipment, they do some work, their vehicles get blown up and they bring new ones. We don't have that capability," he said.
"We can draw a parallel with the way they attack with waves of so-called 'meat attacks'. This is roughly the same way they entrench their positions," the soldier added.
Besides mines, drones are crucial in continuously monitoring the border, according to the Ukrainian serviceman. Similarly, Lithuania is currently planning to build a so-called "drone wall" with other Baltic and Nordic countries to monitor the border.
"Reconnaissance drones need to be constantly in the air and watching. It doesn't matter who is hiding what and where, but any movement of large columns of troops will still be visible," he said.
Kursk operation continues
Ukrainian casualties remain unclear, but one member of the 44th Brigade told the Wall Street Journal that they are much lower than in last year's counter-offensive.
"The operation is going well. We have video footage, for example, of our guys being very successful in ambushing, capturing officers and commanders with certain information," the Ukrainian soldier said.
Their unit has now started attacking Russian supply lines.
"They thought there was nothing there, but our forces were already in place," he added. "The Russian troops we captured were surprised, to say the least."
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