In an exclusive interview with LRT.lt, Lithuania’s Chief of Defence Valdemaras Rupšys speaks about the changes following the war in Ukraine, why Lithuania has not yet bought tanks, and why further Russian aggression is likely.
What will change for the Lithuanian Armed Forces after Russia's war in Ukraine?
Before this war, not everyone in our country had the same understanding that the threat coming from Russia was real. Someone denied the threat, someone said that Lithuania was incapable of defending itself, someone did not believe in collective defence. The war in Ukraine changes everything – it has shown that NATO is alive and kicking, that it is capable of deterring Russian military aggression, that it is ready and has the capacity to defend its member states, including Lithuania. The statement by the US and NATO Secretary General that not one centimetre of [territory] can be lost is very clear and I believe it.
Russia is currently engaged in a war and is bleeding and has suffered heavy casualties. It needs time to rebuild the military strength it had before the war. The security architecture needs to be modelled in three clear phases, including an assessment of what’s happening today, a deterrence plan, a defence plan. It also means anticipating what the threat might be in the medium term, between one and five years, and the longer term threats, after five years or more, when Russia might have rebuilt its capabilities.
Military threats cannot be seen in isolation from political threats. It will all depend on who, what kind of regime is in charge of Russia. My personal assessment is that Russia will remain unchanged and will remain a threat to us and NATO. Moreover, that threat could be even greater, and NATO countries must therefore be prepared to deter it. Russia must be deterred so that it does not do what it is doing now when it has decided to attack Ukraine.
How long can it take for Russia to regain its strength?
There are many factors at work, economic sanctions [...], but I think it will take five to ten years before it can be a conventional threat [again]. After this war, it will definitely have lost conventional forces and power. In wars, armies evolve, gain momentum and strength if the state is not economically weakened.
However, the economic problems in Russia are severe. Recovery will not be quick. [...] Russia has shown that it is not technologically capable of being an equal competitor to the West. [Russian President Vladimir] Putin thought so, and his regime was deceived into thinking that it had the best army in the world. [The Russian] Intelligence, perhaps, has also failed to give a true picture of what is going on even close to Russia, in Ukraine. The political leadership has been misled.
I would say that this is state-level corruption, [...] where the political leadership has not been exposed to the true picture of Russian power out of fear or other calculations. I think that the Russian army, the generals, the military, even the intelligence agencies, [...] probably did not themselves believe that Putin could take the decision to attack Ukraine. And when he did, they must have been shocked.
If you look at their operational decisions, let's say to invade Ukraine in eight directions at the beginning of the war, you have to have a very well-equipped, extremely well-trained army. All types of armies have to have good interoperability and cohesion if they want to achieve this.
Can any country in the world do such an operation? I would think so, but only the Americans or a coalition with the US military. What Russia has done is nonsense, and we had grave doubts about it, and those doubts have been confirmed.
You say that the Russian military threat will only increase in the future. What are the reasons for this?
I would say that Russia's revanchism has not gone anywhere. I am not saying that it has lost all the battles, but just because Ukraine held out, Russia has already lost the war at this point.
The retreat from Kyiv is a clear indication of the failure of their first idea [...].I believe that the centre of gravity of this military invasion was to overthrow the political leadership. They failed [...] and now they are trying a new round of war by taking over territories. I think they have little hope of destroying the Ukrainian army.
In Lithuania, this war is said to be a turning point, with Lithuania's military strategy shifting from deterrence to defence. What should change, will the Lithuanian military be different after the war?
One has to be careful with terminology. Sun Tzu said that war must be won without a battle. The aggressor, the potential adversary, let us not mince words, Russia, should not even have the idea of carrying out a military invasion of a NATO country. We should discourage it by telling it that using conventional forces is hopeless. NATO must make it clear, and it is doing so.
The use of non-conventional forces, ie nuclear weapons, is a total defeat. [...] There will be no victory after a nuclear war, because everybody will have lost, and it could lead to an unmanageable, uncontrollable situation. [...] And even Russia probably understands this.
Political parties in Lithuania are working on a defence agreement. What do you want from politicians as a commander of the armed forces?
This is a political document, but I would like it to be strategic. Not to mix strategic objectives with tactical ones. [...] There must be commitments, ideas on how to ensure the security of the state, regardless of the party in power. And tactics must be left to the professionals.
You must be referring to the point in the agreement to fortify the Suwalki corridor? Do you not think that is a priority?
I don't think tactical things should be in the parties' agreement. That is not the issue. It is the issue of funding, it is the issue of the involvement of institutions in the defence system. It is also about setting requirements for public and private entities to reflect national security requirements, [...] to ensure that they do not interfere with national security. For example, if infrastructure is developed, it must reflect national security interests.
If buildings are constructed, they must also reflect defence needs. For example, bomb shelters [...] are not a requirement. I would suggest that such a requirement could arise. Another is that bridges and roads have to be able to carry tanks or heavy equipment from NATO countries.
Does the Lithuanian Armed Forces have problems with roads and bridges?
There is a problem. Throughout independence, we did not pay much attention to making the infrastructure suitable for defence purposes.
Another question that is now being asked is to what extent the public should be involved in defence: will there be universal conscription or will the Riflemen’s Union be strengthened? Does the military need this?
I am impressed that that question is being raised, because the military alone is not capable of guaranteeing the security of the state. But we need to look at the whole picture. Our objective in joining NATO was to guarantee collective defence, and we have done that. NATO does not have its own army; NATO is the armies of the states. In order to deter and secure the security of NATO countries through defence, we must have the military capabilities to do so. We need to develop our military to meet NATO's expectations, plans, requirements, so that the [Lithuanian] armed forces is not a weak link in NATO. We cannot have an army like the great powers, but we must develop it to the best of our abilities in terms of training, equipment, supplies and ammunition, and in terms of being able to carry out NATO tasks.
Institutions that are part of the armed forces can be used alongside the military. When under Martial Law, armed forces incorporate the State Border Guard Service, the Public Security Service, the State Security Service, the Second Department of Operational Services, and the combat units of the Riflemen’s Union. There are also citizens' resistance units, which must be set up, which would have distinctive insignia and a commander, and may be incorporated into the forces by decision of the commander of the Armed Forces.
However, those who defend with arms are only one part.
The other important part is the people who work in the various fields: the food industry, transport, medicine. They must also be prepared to carry out their tasks in the event of war. This involves practically every part of society. [...] However, by including the civilian element, we cannot put the armed forces at risk.
In modern warfare, there is a huge threat of friendly fire. You cannot give a weapon to just anyone, because they will not know where the enemy is. In Ukraine, for example – everyone's uniforms are the same type of camouflage. To distinguish between their own and the invaders, they tie ties: white, blue, yellow.
If there is a war and there are troops from NATO countries, and a person is unprepared, but he has a weapon because he wants to go to war so badly, he will not be able to distinguish between a Frenchman, a German and a Russian, and he will not be able to distinguish between the different uniforms. The military is ready for that.
The second thing is that war is a matter of life and death. A person is unprepared for collective tasks. [...] Some people have a very primitive idea that they will take up a rifle and defend the country – they do not understand that they can only be potential victims, and that the benefits will be very small.
The picture we are seeing in Ukraine [of civilians taking up arms] is one of last resort, when the army is no longer able to [function], and then the public will go out and shoot anyone with a gun. [But] it is the armed forces that have to fight a real war.
One of the key developments for the military this year will be the purchase of MRSL systems. At what stage is it currently? Who needs them?
There was clear military advice to the Defence Minister that we needed them and why. They are an effective weapon for destroying special targets, command posts, the enemy's logistical capabilities, the targets that are far away from the enemy's forward manoeuvre units.
The second thing is that it is a sign to a potential adversary that Lithuania is capable of destroying not only the adversary's forward units, armoured vehicles and personnel, as the Ukrainians are doing now, but also that we can destroy their logistic chains at a distance of 100 kilometres of more, including their headquarters, their command posts, their support units, their artillery.
We are now in talks with the US about what kind of MRLS system [will be acquired], as well as the conditions and the timing.
Lithuania's defence funding will increase. What will the funds be spent on?
In case of war, we should have at least three manoeuvre brigades. We need to develop a medium infantry brigade to an international standard, so that it is equipped with all [modern] platforms. The defence [budget] will be made available to develop this.
A light infantry brigade would be a bit simpler. [...] As a commander, I would be happy to have everything, even tanks, and I can see the need, but with the price has to be weighed up.
Can we not afford tanks yet?
No. A lot of things won't work out. Next, the special operations forces – they need to be capable, they need to be trained to operate in the kind of war that we are seeing in Ukraine, which is a high-intensity war with Russia.
My idea is that the special operations forces must be able to carry out reconnaissance. This is also a relevant capability, and there must be appropriate funding for it. There is a new area in the naval forces, coastal defence, which we need to start developing. [...] Air defence has fairly modern short and medium range air defence systems, but more is needed.
Logistics – it is clear from what we are seeing in Ukraine that it will not be the case that there are [weapons] to spare but nothing to fire from them. Stockpiling is a huge challenge for both the armed forces and the state. What a soldier has in his hands, operational and strategic reserves, is a huge amount of work, not to mention medical and engineering supplies. These are different areas that need to be modernised, maintained.
It is now popular to say that only Lithuania and the Baltic states have understood the Russian threat. Do you agree with that? The next question is whether this war is bringing NATO back to Europe and whether there is a consensus on how to defend ourselves against Russia.
The NATO military, the commanders, the generals, have understood before – both the threats and how we should deter and defend ourselves. Not understanding and not appreciating the threat is not a question for the military, it is a question that we should address to the politicians and even the citizens of those countries.
This war is radically changing the situation, as professor [Vytautas] Landsberg once said – “the cats have woken up”. This is reflected in the provision of tools for military planning, for realistic calculations of forces in the event that we have to go to war with Russia, not just to deter.
The big job is to replan the defence system. The other threats have not gone away either, and no one has eliminated terrorist threats. But the main threat to NATO countries today is Russia. There are clear decisions at the NATO political level, tasks for the military staff on how to neutralise the threats, how to be ready if Russia wants to use military power against a NATO country. This is being done with a short-term, a long-term plan, and with a realistic calculation of capabilities. We need to send a clear signal, not only in words but also in actions.
And yet, many people in Lithuania today are very afraid of war. They imagine that Russia would come in, wage a conventional war and simply wipe our country out. You have said that Russia would need months to prepare to attack.
Russia has been involved in a misjudged war in Ukraine, it has overestimated its power and underestimated Ukraine, and it has suffered heavy losses. Russia has seen that it is not as powerful as it thought it was. It will have to take time to rebuild its capabilities before it can threaten others – if that regime remains and has the political will to continue to threaten, which I have no doubt it will.
That gives us time to prepare. It is not a month, it is not a year and it is not two years. I think we will prepare for that and we will deter Russia. But as they say, if you want peace, prepare for war.
We have to prepare for a fierce war in order to avoid war. Looking at what is happening now, there is no threat of a conventional war for Lithuania. [...] Russia has tried to bite off more than it can chew, it has bared its teeth, and now it should be even more careful.
The second thing is that the intelligence has worked very well, the warning systems are working perfectly. I am sure that the NATO intelligence system sees the picture in real time and sends out warnings to be prepared. We will certainly have time to prepare.
What NATO intelligence predicted would happen in Ukraine has happened. We need to be on high alert to show that they will not be able to get away with any adventures. And we must have the forces to be able to quickly put them on a higher combat readiness to prevent any adventures.
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