With the US and other diplomatic heavyweights absent, Belarus’s smaller European neighbours have been leading the diplomatic response to the post-election crisis, writes Anna Wieslander from the Atlantic Council.
Increased great power competition tends to lessen the space for manoeuvre for smaller states. However, smaller states can still make a difference in international affairs, which the recent development in Belarus is a striking example of.
In the past weeks, the Baltic states and Poland have emerged as leaders in pushing for an international response to the worrying situation in Belarus, as discussed at [Wednesday’s] European Council meeting.
Read more: People in Belarus notice solidarity in Lithuania, says diplomat
With most of Europe in vacation mood, the people of Belarus started to peacefully protest in response to the rigged presidential election on August 9. Worrisome signs came already before the elections, causing Lithuanian foreign minister, Linas Linkevičius, to call EU High Representative Josep Borrell on August 7 to discuss the situation, underlining the importance of joint EU responses.
The same day, Poland used the Weimar format to issue a statement with France and Germany appealing to the Belarusian leadership to conduct free and fair elections and release all political prisoners.
In the week that followed, the western neighbours of Belarus worked intensely through various formats to shape consensus on actions that could be taken. On August 10, the foreign ministers of Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine issued a statement calling for dialogue, respect for human rights and the refrain of use of force against the protesters.
On August 11, the statement of Nordic-Baltic Foreign Ministers raised similar concerns, as did the joint statement of the presidents of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland on August 13, in which they offered to act as mediators, and the joint statement of the prime ministers of the Baltic states on August 15, also calling for new elections, and EU sanctions against officials responsible for the violence.
In addition, Estonia used its non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council to raise the post-election situation in Belarus on August 12 in conjunction to a session on peacebuilding, and announced an intention to bring the situation in Belarus to the Security Council “at the earliest opportunity”.
Read more: Lithuanian parliament declares Lukashenko not legitimate leader of Belarus
Estonia also led a call joined by Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic to Josep Borrell and European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Oliviér Várhelyi ahead of the EU meeting with foreign ministers on August 14.
In the call, they stressed the need for sanctions and support for civil society in Belarus, and suggested that the EU could assume the role of mediator in Belarus. At the EU meeting, the member states agreed to prepare sanctions against those responsible for violence, arrests, and fraud in connection to the election.
On one hand, it might appear natural that neighbours to a troubled country take the lead to galvanize support and attention for the situation. On the other hand, its close ties to Russia makes Belarus a special case with implications far beyond its borders.
How developments in Belarus will unfold will set the example for the European security order and the great power balance ahead. As for democracy, [Russian] president Putin has made clear on several occasions that he does not accept popular uprisings neither in Russia nor in surrounding countries, and he has confirmed that by Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine.
The uprising of the people in Belarus is also about democracy versus authoritarianism on a larger scale. Militarily, Belarus is partly integrated with Russia and strategically, in Russian thinking, included in its western flank and defensive depth.
Read more: Baltic countries, Poland demand new vote in Belarus
If Russia would move militarily to secure its interests in Belarus, this would affect the security for the whole transatlantic area. So even though Belarus is a country less known by many, the events that are unfolding now play into a much larger international setting than Northern Europe.
Both the value and the military dimension justify great power leadership, most naturally the United States, but also the UK; countries with strong diplomatic toolkits backed by military might, which Russia respects. So far, neither the US nor the UK has shown much interest in the destiny of Belarus.
US Secretary of State Pompeo expressed on August 12 concern about the developments and stated that the US would “work with our European friends” on how to respond, without putting concrete ideas on the table, despite a timely trip to Eastern Europe the week after the Belarus election. The UK kept a very low profile on Belarus during the week following the August 9 election.
In consequence, the western neighbours of Belarus have had to compensate for the lack of external great power engagement by means available for smaller states; to advocate, put proposals on the table, build coalitions and push within institutions such as the EU, UN, the OSCE, and if necessary, NATO. So far, they have been successful in moving the EU forward and getting support from Germany and France, who gradually have become more active.
However, if Russia decides to take military action to secure its interests in Belarus, the EU toolbox will have its clear limits, as will German and French support.
Read more: Lithuania drafts national sanctions against Belarusian regime
The Baltic states and Poland could then call for consultations in NATO, and the US and the UK would have to engage in order to deal with the military strategic consequences, but by then, the West would once again face a Russian-made fait accompli on the ground.
Clearly, greater diplomatic efforts from the US and the UK now, in close collaboration with the EU and its member states, would be preferable, as conflict prevention and de-escalation is still possible. Even if smaller states step up on leadership there are limits to what they can compensate for.
Anna Wieslander is Director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council. This story was originally published at EurActiv, partners of LRT English.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of LRT.
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