After the war in Ukraine, Russia will rebuild its capabilities and continue to pose a threat. But Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave, bordering Lithuania and Poland, will become less of an issue to NATO with Finland and Sweden’s accession, says Commander of NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) in Lithuania, Colonel Peter Nielsen, in an interview with LRT.lt.
How do you assess the current security situation in the region?
It has changed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine because initially, Russia used all its professional standing forces from everywhere in Russia – raging from the Far East to Murmansk. They were put around Ukraine and were part of the attack.
Russia has started to rebuild, but its focus is 100 percent on Ukraine now. The situation, looking at the numbers, is better than it was before the invasion.
But Lithuania and the other Baltic countries are talking about the need to strengthen their defence, and the issue of the German brigade is particularly important for Lithuania.
When the war ends, Russia will rebuild, and then we will have a probably stronger Russia with a willingness to use its strength. So, the capacity and the willingness to use it give us a measure of the threat. The willingness to use has already been shown, and the capacity will be built up.
Of course, the situation in the region will change – it is better now than it was before, but it will probably change for the worse later.
In the few years that you've been in Lithuania, what changes have you seen in the country’s defence and security, and where do we still need to improve?
I think you’re doing a lot. There’s a lot of new equipment coming in, and there are interesting procurement plans. The infrastructure is being built with the barracks and training areas. A lot of good things are being done.
If I tried to imagine a perfect situation in a frontline country, I would look at Ukraine, but also at Israel and Finland. These are the countries that have been on the frontline and have maintained this comprehensive defence, where the whole society is involved. This is probably an area where you could still do more, ie to involve the whole society in this.
It’s not just the Armed Forces and it’s not just NATO. It’s all of Lithuania: the hospitals, teachers, everyone in Lithuania. This approach where the whole society should be able to function in wartime is a very important mental process, and, of course, practical things also need to be done.
I see changes in your own position over the years. In 2020, you told The New York Times that the biggest challenge for Lithuania was the Suwalki Gap and the Russian minority. In 2023, you said that Kaliningrad was a Russian, not a Lithuanian, problem. What caused this change?
I think Kaliningrad is still an issue for NATO, but the ascension of Finland and the upcoming ascension of Sweden will totally change the setup in the Baltic Sea region. Russia will experience Kaliningrad being surrounded, but it will still be an issue for us because there are capabilities in Kaliningrad. We still need to take this into consideration and make plans for it, but it is now totally surrounded, so Russians need to make plans to reinforce it and have connections to the exclave in wartime. [...]
[The Suwalki Gap] is still a very important territory, as it is NATO’s land link to the three Baltic states. Of course, Finland and Sweden are quite close. Now, Sweden’s Gotland island in the Baltic Sea will be very important as an “unsinkable carrier”, where planes could take off and land in the event of a war in the Baltics, and where essential supplies could be delivered. Nevertheless, we would still need to keep the Suwalki Gap open.
What is the current military situation in Kaliningrad? We’ve been talking about the navy, the nuclear weapons, and other Russian military capabilities there.
There’s still a very big concentration of military assets in Kaliningrad, but the conventional war-fighting assets are being taken out of Kaliningrad and sent to Ukraine. What we see in Kaliningrad is what we see in other Russian regions as well, including the border with Finland.
Kaliningrad is not as much of a threat as it used to be, but it’s still an issue because Lithuania would have to fight a war on two fronts, so to speak. [...]
When we talk about the security situation in the region, we cannot ignore Russia's war in Ukraine. The Kyiv counter-offensive is ongoing, but its progress is slower than most people expected. How do you assess the situation on the battlefield?
I think we see a frozen front now where Ukraine is trying to attack just small bits in one area, and Russians are trying to attack in another area. Yes, there are small tactical gains, but the big picture doesn’t really change. It’s important to note that this is the land war we are talking about.
If you look at what’s happening in the sea, the Russian Navy now has difficulties manoeuvring in the Black Sea because of Ukraine’s attacks. They forced the Russian navy away from Sevastopol to the eastern part of the Black Sea, which was a major feat for the Ukrainians.
But winter is coming, and we will see stalled action on land, so we’ll wait for spring. I hope that help from the West will continue to flow in, and that we will help Ukraine to train its forces so that they will be able to win in the end.
Recently, the Balticconector pipeline linking Finland and Estonia was damaged. This is not the only pipeline in the Baltic Sea that is believed to be vulnerable to external forces. What should we do to ensure the security of infrastructure in the Baltic Sea?
First, we need to acknowledge that there’s a hybrid war with Russia going on right now, and we need to confront Russia in the hybrid domain. When they attack us in the cyber domain, we need to confront them there, when they attack us in the information domain, we need to confront them there, and when we suspect them of attacking the critical infrastructure, we need to look into that.
I know this is a huge task, but we should also not lose focus on the real war that’s going on in Ukraine – this is the mother of all wars of our time. We have this dilemma now with the continued support for Ukraine and also building our own defence and capabilities to counter the direct threat within this hybrid warfare. We need to do both and Russia, of course, wants us to put more money into our own defence and forget about Ukraine, but we need to remember Ukraine.
Do you think Russia and Belarus are now a threat to NATO countries?
I think that the biggest threat is the hybrid war that will continue. You just had bomb threats sent to your schools. This disruption of our societies, this constant attack with false information and fake news, trying to influence the voters, is something that we will probably see continuing.
We need to be aware of this and not neglect it saying, “This is just Russia, and we don’t believe it”. There are some people who believe this, and we’ve seen that in some countries there are actually governments that are more open to the Russian narrative. [...]
In the beginning, you said that after the war, Russia would rebuild its capabilities and the threat would grow again. So, you don’t believe that Russia could be a peaceful country?
I hope, but I don’t believe it. It takes generations to change that because, I think, the problem is more than Putin. There was a denazification of Germany after the Second World War. We need a deputinisation in Russia to make them into a peaceful country like Germany has become.
Do you think Russia would be willing to go to war against NATO?
Russia will do whatever it can not to start this war because, I think, they know they should not mess with NATO.
The issue is, if we move forward in time and if we – I hope not – allow Ukraine to lose, then other nations will look into this and they will draw their lessons from this. Iran will draw their lessons in relation to Israel, China will draw their lessons in relation to Taiwan. Then the focus of the US would be in the Pacific, and that would leave Russia to the Europeans more or less.
We really need to spend the 2 percent [of GDP on defence] and to even get above that. [...] If we can present that picture to Russia, then, I hope, they will not come. Only the enemy decides if your deterrence is working.
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