Hunched in her chair, Lithuania’s president at the time, Dalia Grybauskaitė, sat next to Vladimir Putin, leaning back in his seat. Putin did not hold back – Lithuania was reliant almost completely on trade with Moscow, he claimed. This was not true, Grybauskaitė chimed in, to which Putin just grinned.
After the press conference in 2010 and behind closed doors, Grybauskaitė would later recall that the Russian leader cursed at her and presented a list of ultimatums on trade and energy.
“It was not an offer of friendship or cooperation. It was either you get on your knees and obey, or you are the enemy,” she said in an interview with local media in 2017.
This would be Grybauskaitė’s last meeting with Putin. It also became one of the foundation stones for her hawkish Russia position, for which she would later be branded in the Western media as the Baltic “Iron Lady”.
With Washington rushing into negotiations to reach a peace deal in Ukraine, observers worry that the Americans – in their haste – could succumb to Russia’s demands.
Typically, the Russians adopt an all-or-nothing hard line until they come up against a brick wall. In that case, they “de-dramatise” the situation, playing down their previous rhetoric and moving on, according to Linas Linkevičius, Lithuania’s top diplomat from 2010 until 2020. Before that, he was the country’s defence minister as Vilnius was making its way toward NATO.
“I remember the opposition to NATO and how having former Soviet Union territories [in the alliance] was a completely uncompromising issue,” Linkevičius told LRT.lt.
“At the time, we weren’t directly aware of it, but speaking with colleagues from the White House later, it became clear that George W Bush simply decided there was a chance to admit the Baltic states into NATO now, or who knows when – maybe never,” recalled the current Lithuanian ambassador to Sweden.
This transformed Lithuania’s bargaining power from that of an underdog to a position of strength. “Only then did the Russians start communicating with us. We would invite them to various seminars and exercises, but they wouldn’t even respond to our letters,” Linkevičius added.
In a private conversation with his Russian counterpart at the time, Sergey Ivanov, Linkevičius delivered the news that Lithuania would join NATO – despite Russia’s previous talk of red lines.
“I remember his question. He said, ‘So, you’re joining NATO next year?’,” Linkevičius recalled. “And I told him, ‘Next year, if everything goes well, we’ll be candidates, and in 2004, we’ll become members.’ ‘All right then,’ he said.”
That was it.
“Russians always take a categorical position, and it is based on the argument of force. If that doesn’t work, they de-dramatise the situation, saying it’s not that important,” Linkevičius said.
“It was the same with Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership,” he added.
Moscow’s red lines surrounding various weapon supplies to Ukraine – from tanks to fighter jets – also ultimately faded into irrelevance once the equipment was delivered to Kyiv.
While Linkevičius was in his post, Lithuania had to hold off the Kremlin’s attempts to secure a military transit corridor to reach its Kaliningrad exclave on the Baltic coast, which would have grounded the country’s EU and NATO aspirations to a halt.
According to the former minister, Lithuania said Russia’s military transit deal was already working well enough. However, if the Kremlin wanted to renegotiate, the process would be tightened, because Lithuania was due to join NATO. This made Moscow back off.
“We can’t really talk from a position of power, because we don’t have much of it. But if there is reciprocity, or at least arguments of benefit and harm, that can be a factor in negotiations with the Russians.
But if they don’t see any arguments from the other side, they push forward until they’re stopped or stop themselves,” Linkevičius said.
For the past three years, Russia has been doing exactly that in Ukraine.
“When Crimea was annexed, there were practically no sanctions. I won’t even mention the 2008 war in the South Caucasus, where there was nothing at all. They learned the lesson that the price is acceptable, and they keep going until someone stops them.
“And now, there was an attempt to stop Russia, but an unexpected ‘helper’ emerged from the United States, almost justifying their methods and concerns about their so-called security situation at the expense of other countries,” Linkevičius added.
A former Lithuanian official, who previously took part in negotiations with Russia, said what’s happening now cannot be described as negotiations – “This is a power game, period. These are street rules with a gun on the table.” He preferred to remain anonymous to present a candid assessment of the situation.
“I’ve been in negotiations with Russians – in Moscow and elsewhere – where they said, ‘We are so big, and you are so small,’” the source recalled. “So how can Lithuania show strength to Russia? Our approach to power is completely different – whether dealing with Russia, the US, or China. The tactic is finding alternatives. You won’t defeat Russia, but you can avoid it.”
An example of that approach was to develop alternative energy sources after years of trying unsuccessfully to negotiate market prices for gas imports. As the Baltic states were fully reliant on them, Moscow used aggressive pricing in an attempt to coerce Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to toe its line.
“When Russia started its energy war against all of Europe in 2022, trying to freeze Germany, Lithuania emerged as the winner. Why? Because we created an alternative – an LNG terminal – we repelled Russia’s attack,” the former official said.
“Russia is now, out of desperation, tugging at our cables and anchors. When they can’t do anything to such a small country, they start yanking cables and pipelines – that’s low even for them,” the source added.
Any talk of adopting a negotiating strategy, or trying to transform theory into practice, is now irrelevant, the former official insisted.
“Through an understanding of interests, you could try to find some rational grain, but who now knows what Putin wants?”
Your watch, my time
In December 2021, Vygaudas Ušackas, a senior Lithuanian and Brussels diplomat and former EU ambassador to Russia, departed for Moscow with his American, German, and French counterparts. Their goal was to meet Kremlin and Foreign Ministry officials to see if there could be a middle ground between Ukraine and Russia to stop the impending invasion.
The confidential trip was not sanctioned by the Lithuanian government, but had the blessing from “other governments” and Kyiv.
They failed.
“It was clear that Moscow had already taken a decision [to invade],” Ušackas said, citing details discussed in his recent book.
However, he would not disclose the nature of the proposed middle ground, saying it was agreed with Ukraine’s leadership and they may choose to return to it later.
“The negotiating mechanisms are not straightforward – in addition to direct contacts between Moscow and Washington, there are many informal channels involving former military, diplomats and intelligence officers,” said Ušackas.
The attempt to reach a deal in Moscow echoed his previous meetings with Russian officials. In 2017, the Kremlin spoke openly of its determination to demonstrate staying power in making Ukraine “a vassal state”, according to Ušackas.
“[Foreign Minister Sergei] Lavrov and his right-hand man in the Kremlin, Yuri Ushakov, told me: “You will see, not in the next election [2019], but in eight years' time Russia will have its man in Kyiv,” according to Ušackas.
He also took part in the economic three-party consultations between Brussels, Kyiv and Moscow that continued even after the 2014 Crimean annexation.
The goal was to discuss ways to minimise the negative impact on Russia’s economy once Ukraine finally decouples from the decades-long entanglement with Moscow and moves toward the European Union.
“Consultations took place between the economy vice minister from Ukraine and Russia, but it became clear that Russia was not acting in good faith.
They were simply trying to use these discussions to demonstrate to the Europeans that the Ukrainians are not being cooperative, and to the Russians that the EU is not being cooperative and that the Russian economy was being harmed,” said Ušackas.
To him, Russia’s demands reminded him of dealing with the Taliban when he was the EU special representative to Afghanistan.
“The Taliban said after my first meeting in 2012 that you Westerners have a watch, but we have the time. In my opinion, Putin's team thinks very similarly,” he said.
They hope that the West will grow tired and ultimately succumb to Russian demands.
“On the other hand, Ukraine is not a vital issue for the West. For us, for the Baltic states, for Poland, for Finland, this is our war,” Ušackas added.
Lithuania previously secured a deal with Russia on the unconditional withdrawal of troops from its territory in 1993. But this was also part of a wider package of negotiations between Washington and Moscow, Ušackas said.
Russia was also weak at the time.
“But even these were tough negotiations, and in the current context, only a position of strength can force Russia to make concessions. Russia understands force,” he added.
It’s unclear how weak – or strong – Russia is at the moment due to the information blackout on the state of its economy and society.
“I talk to [the Russians] and they say that inflation is huge, interest rates can be as high as 100 percent if you borrow privately. But the economy is holding up,” said Ušackas.
Yet it’s clear that Putin now believes he is in a position of power.
“But when will the clock start ticking for Putin? This is now the key question for Russia, because it would help change the attitude that the West has the watch, but they have the time,” he added.
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