While the Russian threat will not go away as long as Vladimir Putin lives, Europe must also prepare to contain Russia’s possible destabilisation in the event of his passing. This is the most realistic possibility for change, says Dr Kirill Shamiev, visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

Democracy is possible in Russia, he believes, but the EU needs to work out scenarios for how it will re-establish relations with actors in post-Putin Russia and promote reforms.

You researched Russian military reforms for your PhD thesis. In the wake of the Ukraine invasion, there was some speculation that Moscow had believed its military to be on par with that of the United States. Do you think it credible that Russia could have overestimated its military might to that extent?

Based on my research and everything I know about the Russian military, inside Russia no one ever claimed that the Russian forces are as capable as the American ones. Especially military officers, they understand their own limitations, at least in their own sphere of where they serve. They could have considered that they were second, maybe in the top three. But even the most conservative, pro-war, if you will, Z-fascist, thought that the Americans were stronger.

When Putin came to power in 2000, there were objective reasons to implement military reforms. There were lots of cases of so-called hazing, dedovchina in Russian, and violence inside the military, corruption, lots of basic crumbling infrastructure, tanks falling apart. But mostly violence, because Russia had a strong conscription, a significant number of young people had to serve in the military, if they couldn’t afford to bribe the recruitment officers.

Despite all the attempts by Putin to centralise political power – which he did successfully, transitioning from unstable, crumbling democracy in the late 1990s to full-fledged authoritarianism – he struggled to reform the military. The first eight years were basically lost, despite the huge economic growth, more money invested in the military, because the reform programs were sometimes inadequate, sometimes very strongly opposed by the military elites. Putin himself wasn’t invested in the military reform, he didn’t appoint knowledgeable people, he didn’t personally control the process. He focused more on integration with the West, social support, economic development.

But everything changed from 2008, after the war with Georgia. Well, I must say that the first reform attempts started already in 2007. The Georgia war just became a trigger, a very good case to show to the military: look, you’re not as capable as you claim. And this is also when [Anatoly] Serdyukov was appointed as defence minister. He was a civilian from the Federal Tax Service, he had been involved in the imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the basically nationalisation of his company Yukos. A pure Putin guy, he was tasked with implementing a very radical reform, lots of cuts, including officers, structural reform, logistics, equipment, rearmament efforts.

He did achieve some success, but obviously faced very strong opposition, not only from inside the military, but from other security agencies and the military industrial complex. Due to the Soviet past, Russia still has these small towns that are purely dependent on military production. And Serdyukov also tried to reform that. He famously said “if the Russian industry cannot produce it, we will buy it in the West”. And he did buy some stuff in the West. For the Soviet-minded people, it was like treason. So he got ousted in 2012.

And his reforms did improve military units. They became more agile, more flexible, the service conditions became better. Soldiers started receiving finally some kind of normal salary, considering that most soldiers are from poor families.

What changed once Sergei Shoigu was in charge of the military?

Shoigu is Putin’s personal buddy, from the 1990s. He was a former politician, quite famous in the 90s, some even considered him as a possible Yeltsin successor, but he didn’t run. And this is when the pace of development slowed down. Shogo focused a lot on what in the literature is called intrusive control. The military call it photo reports, basically instead of developing proper exercises, proper tests, some kind of evaluation system, it’s just pure direct control.

In a big organisation with millions of people, it’s ineffective. And this is when the pace of development slowed down. He always wanted to give the best information to the president and the military exercises put a great emphasis on showing strength. That’s why Western observers were a bit misled by this window dressing and just pure display of material capacities, new tanks, new fighter jets, new drones.

But inside it started to rot. Because of unfinished reforms of Serdyukov, but also Shoigu’s style of management. Moreover, successes in Syria and the annexation of Crimea – a remarkable success from the operation standpoint, if you put political and moral views aside – created this bubble of conviction that the Russian military was strong.

I believe that those saying that the Russian military was strong were not entirely wrong. A lot of the failures we’ve seen since last year can be attributed to the military not having actually been preparing for this invasion. We’ve heard from multiple witnesses, including soldiers who emigrated to the West and got asylum, that Putin was truly looking at the invasion as a special military operation, he still insists on calling it that.

I think the plan was originally developed by some special services and Putin, his circle of friends. In an ideal world, Shoigu and also General [Valery] Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff, were supposed to stop this unrealistic invasion plan. But considering this personalised system, maybe Shoigu also believed in it and Gerasimov just succumbed and decided to obey. There was something wrong on the strategic level, the whole operation was bizarre.

In the first six months, Russia lost a lot of its best capabilities, best soldiers, and then all the old structural problems kicked in, poor adaptation, rigid command and control structure incapable of adapting. Also, people just deserted.

But we shouldn’t draw conclusions just from one case. The cases in Syria, in Crimea show that, indeed, without the reforms in 2012 nothing Russian military did would have been possible.

What do you think is the current condition of the Russian military? Some analysts say that it will emerge from the war stronger, more experienced.

It’s a very difficult question. Not only because of the limits of information we have, but also because it’s changing constantly. My answer could be wrong in several months.

Basically, it’s going to be a new military. Now it is heavily reliant on mobilised personnel, private military companies, mercenaries. They lost a lot of its material equipment, according to open sources. They also started reforming the military – of course, they won’t push too much during the war, but I think the planning is already happening.

So from a semi-professional military force, limited but capable in some spheres, we are now back to a mobilised military force with the focus on heavy firepower.

Another question is the integration of private military companies. We don’t know whether they will formalise them, adapt some laws on private military companies, or integrate them in the military structure.

We shouldn’t underestimate how quickly the military can recover, especially if Putin stays in power and he desires to continue this aggressive militarised foreign policy. With proper political will, they can solve structural problems that led to the poor adaptability and poor planning.

If the war ended today, I’d expect that in five years, the military would resurface and with a lot of angry and very experienced personnel. And if the Russian government decides to put this experience to use, it would help them develop for sure. But here is always a degree of scepticism for me because Putin’s regime has proven they can make remarkable mistakes, just shooting themselves in the foot.

You’ve touched on the possibility that the Russian military succumbed to the pressure from the security services. What do you think was the role of the military in the Putin regime and how it may have changed?

The original question of civil-military relations is how to ensure that the military does not organise a coup d’état. And here Russia belongs to what I call the club of “happy nations”, Russia hasn’t had a successful military coup since 1801. The military, especially due to the Soviet times, is highly subjugated to the civilian rule. And when I interviewed former military officers, I could see that there’s the military ethos that, right or wrong, we must implement civilian decisions. When I tried to touch upon their involvement in policy, they said it’s something that underdeveloped countries do, we will never do it, even if it may hurt us. We may hate the politician, the supreme commander, but he’s the civilian leader and we must obey. The Russian military is depoliticised.

But there is an important caveat. The Russian military, at least before the war, saw themselves as an important source of patriotism, of socialising citizens as real Russians with good qualities. Unlike liberals like me, who’s the opposite of that. This is a problem because many people will be veterans, they will still, I think, somehow play a role in the transformation of the regime.

The third level is the influence on policymaking. The Russian military has a lot of influence and autonomy in managing themselves. That’s why even Putin would struggle to reform the military. The military control information about themselves, they control education, they control access to the regiments. This creates an insulated system where only approved people can participate. And this naturally conserves this military system. For a proper reform, they would need some fresh blood, modern thinking and this would involve conflicts.

And that’s partially why they’re failing in Ukraine, because of this lack of innovation and progressive thinking.

And the final important aspect is the willingness of the military to obey commands on the battlefield. Here is a tricky thing. Because this is a very obedient military, Russian officers do obey all the orders. There are no just institutions and rules that the officers can use to resist even criminal orders. And this is partially what led to war crimes, to executions, the killing of Ukrainian civilians. But also to remarkable failures when junior officers had to implement idiotic orders that led to significant losses on the Russian side.

Another factor that can partially explain war crimes is that when you have soldiers without proper training they’re just men with guns. Uneducated, poorly trained soldiers, when they suffer a casualty, they start shooting everyone that moves. And that led to war crimes, but also that there were some harsh commands to basically find all Ukrainians who collaborated with their government, who basically were patriots of Ukraine, and do something with them.

But they don’t hold a monopoly in military power. We see those private militaries. How are they dealing with that?

This is fascinating, a very new thing for me as a scholar and an analyst. It’s very interesting to look at, even though from the human side, it is horrible, of course.

Number one concern for the military is ensuring proper chain of command. And this is what explains conflicts between [owner of the mercenary Wagner group Yevgeny] Prigozhin and the Russian military. Prigozhin can criticise the Russian military, but the Russian general staff are desperately afraid of insubordinate military units and formations, such as Prigozhin’s force. And once he got more autonomy, it’s just a natural recipe for a conflict.

I’m quite sceptical about Prigozhin’s power. He does criticise and highlight mistakes on the Russian side. That’s good for the regime because it improves information asymmetry. But Prigozhin is fully dependent on the weapons, armaments, missiles, logistics of the Russian military. Prigozhin is obviously very handy for Putin to keep because he’s implementing orders, he’s showing some success. But considering how Putin managed to centralise his power, I think the military and Putin here are in tune. Prigozhin exists as long as he’s useful and they let him do this. But then, I think, they will either show him out to do the things they did n Syria, in Africa and other states, or ask him to stabilise and obey orders.

But that’s on the assumption that the Russian state stays more or less stable. If it’s crumbling, that would be a different story and obviously Prigozhin’s factor would be very important.

In a recent piece for The Guardian, you argued that the EU should prepare plans for the possibility of the collapse of the Russian state. Do you see any signs that the regime is losing power?

To be honest, I’m quite pessimistic and sceptical here. For now, the regime has proven to be very resilient. The executive branch functions very well. Thanks to financial reforms, the sanctions are hurting, but not critically. They’re trying to adapt. It was fascinating how the Kremlin made some regional governors pay and procure equipment for their own troops. That shows how resilient the system is to the shocks.

At the same time, it’s a heavily personalised regime where all the power is connected to one person. Those below are interested in delivering and implementing the top orders because this is the channel for their promotion. And in this case, considering the level of crisis, I think the regime is quite stable. A lot of people think that if Russia loses like 5 percent of GDP, then the regime will be 15-percent destabilised. It doesn’t work like that. It can be resilient up to a point, but then the level of pressure is so high that it starts to collapse.

But for now, they are capable of managing this pressure.

Where can this push come from? The society, ethnic minorities, the military, private military companies?

The number one threat is losing the war. If the majority of the elites were to realise that Russia lost the war, that it was all fruitless and harmful to Russia, this would be the strongest push for other actors to gain more political power, maybe just pure economic power. This would also undermine Putin’s personal legitimacy.

And the presidential administration acknowledges it. I think there is contingency planning. Meduza even leaked the rules how the media is to report if Russia loses more territory in Ukraine. We see that they are strategising basically how to save Putin, that’s their only job. They don’t care much about the people who are responsible for domestic politics, they only care about Putin’s survival. And they are preparing for the worst.

What do you think would constitute a definite loss to Putin?

Losing eastern Ukraine and Crimea, especially Crimea. Considering how they’re destroying eastern Ukraine, they can always claim that there is nothing to annex, it’s all just rubble. But Crimea is more important, they’re preparing to defend it, we see all these fortifications. I think this would be the major factor.

There are speculations that if the regime started to crumble, there would emerge multiple warlords and infighting inside Russia.

I think there are two scenarios how this destabilisation can happen. It’s either the death of Putin with no perfect transition or a popular revolt.

The more likely scenario, considering the Russian regime and the history of similar regimes, is Putin’s death. This would create a window for multiple forces to act in order to gain more political power. Research shows that in 70 percent of cases, the next regime would be authoritarian, just less stable, less capable in terms of executive power. And this would create political and administrative instability on its own. And room for all these warlords, people with guns to claim control.

This is what we argued in our article for The Guardian, that other countries, especially the European Union member states, should strategize, prepare not only for Putin staying in power and reaching a peace deal with Ukraine, but also for Putin dying and triggering political destabilisation.

The EU should have a say in this, because it’s important on multiple levels, both in terms of threats, security situation, but also in terms of opportunities.

If Putin can find a successor, do you think the regime could survive and evolve from there? Or is it just too personalised?

We should distinguish Putinism and authoritarianism. It can still be an authoritarian regime after Putin, especially in the short term. But there’s too much concentration of power on just one person. Look at the high elites, Putin’s friends from the 1990s, those who became useful in the 2000s. They’re all his people. And if he dies, the next leader will appoint people they trust and they know, and this would change the regime.

Considering how institutions function, just if you look up federal laws in Russia, you can see the term president in multiple laws. And this would mean a formal control of all branches of government by the president. So this would still be an authoritarian regime, but not necessarily Putinism.

We cannot properly envisage whether this will be, say, 100-percent dictatorship or democratisation, but there will be a space for the European Union and other states to say: look, if you want a sanctions relief or if you’re so European and you want proper positive relations with the EU, apart from paying reparations to Ukraine here’s a set of political reforms that you need to do. To show that you are adequate rulers. You can do whatever you want with your taxation system, culture, it’s up to Moscow or maybe regions to decide. But there are political rules, political institution, democratic control over security agencies, elections and media.

And this would have an incentive, at least for some politicians: maybe I should follow this advice because it can help have better relations with the West, support economic growth. I’m pretty sure those mid-level bureaucrats in the Russian system are more Western-inclined, they read English books, American political scientists, economists, and they understand the benefits of some separation of power. They may not want to do it now, because they’re rational individuals, but they can see the role of at least some level of democratisation.

Do you imagine it’s possible for the European Union to actually start thinking about how to engage with Russia? The Baltic states and other Eastern Europeans are happy that the Western Europeans are taking their warnings against working with Russia seriously. Might this prevent future engagement with Russia?

Well, I have multiple arguments here. Let’s start with realpolitik. The EU is very concerned about the role of China and other authoritarian states. And if Russia stays a dictatorship and closed from the West, China and the Gulf monarchies would be the obvious choice for them to go to. And this would be a huge problem, not just for the Americans, but also for the European Union. Imagine a scenario where Russian Federation is sharing intelligence with the Chinese. This would be a huge threat for the European Union.

Another thing is just the general approach, how we think about political developments. I think the EU and Lithuania have the capacity to think of different scenarios how Russia can develop. Surely, what Lithuania and the Baltic states do now – prepare for future dictatorship in Russia, invest in security and defence – that’s one way and it’s all right, I totally understand why. And all governments should do it. But it doesn’t mean that they shouldn’t invest in other possibilities and think what would happen if there is destabilisation of power in Russia and attempts to democratise.

Think of Ukraine and Maidan in 2014. I have lots of Ukrainian friends that participated in Maidan. And in late 2013, they themselves didn’t believe change was possible. This scenario was not anticipated, but it happened and it would have been better if other states had been prepared. Or take the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Lithuania – in the West, people and politicians didn’t even know what Lithuania was, right? It would have been better if the West had been more prepared for integrating the Baltic states into the Western world. So that’s why the EU should be ready for multiple scenarios.

And the third argument is that the West preparing for multiple contingencies would also help Russian opposition to see that they’re not isolated. That there are people who want to talk to the democratic leaders, who would consider normalising relations and maybe showing some level of economic and political integration. And it would give moral encouragement. I participated in protests in Saint Petersburg and, on the personal level, it’s really important.

Even if we look at research on democratisation, it show that there are at least four factors that are necessary. First, being surrounded by democratic nations – which is Ukraine within the EU and NATO, it’s one of the closest states for Russians to see that democracy actually works. Second, not being internationally isolated. Third, having experience of democracy and rule of law. This is problematic for Russia. And finally, having pro-democratic actors. And this kind of strategizing and proper strategic communication from Western states, Eastern European states would help.

But in principle, you think democracy is possible in Russia?

As a political scientist, I think democracy is possible in every state. Of course, it’s a matter of structures that exist in place and also actors. If something destabilises Russia, the power of the state goes down, and there are actors inside the system that can be convinced: Hey, there is a way for you to change the state so that we can go back to some kind of pragmatic relations. This would be a powerful mixed combination for supporting these attempts.